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 According to one opinion,1
[s]ince [ninety-nine] percent of the population has access to television, and watches
it for many hours daily, its impact on public perceptions is profound. . . .  “[T]he
majority of the public has never consulted a lawyer, nor experienced the legal system
firsthand.”  The public’s information, then, is secondhand, depending predominantly
on television, which is far more pervasive and profound than movies. . . .  Perry
Mason, based on the Earle Stanley Gardner novels, was a series of movies first
(1934-37), then a radio series on CBS (1944-55), then a series on television (1957-




This Article discusses the benefits of the more subtle, conversational style
of cross-examination as an alternative to the stereotypical gladiator style
of cross-examination.
I.  Introduction
What does the cross-examiner look like?  What images come to mind
when one thinks of a trial lawyer about to cross-examine a witness?  Tall,
silver-haired, and majestic, the gladiator strides toward the witness.  The
witness cowers.  The gladiator wields his sword, piercing the witness and
his story with one strong thrust after another.  When he is finished, both
the story and the witness’s dignity lie in shreds on the floor.  The gladia-
tor stands, sword aloft, and with a barely perceptible nod of his head,
acknowledges the cheers of the crowd.
Given that most people have neither consulted a lawyer nor partici-
pated in an actual trial, why is this image so pervasive in the collective
imagination?  From where do opinions about how trial lawyers behave
come?   Lawyers play a prominent role in television and movie media1
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fashioned: the cagey defense lawyer solves the riddle of each case and in a “surprise”
ending elicits a confession, often in open court, that frees his unjustly accused client.
The hapless DA is left with a shocked and incompetent look on his face.
Ronald Goldfarb, Lawyers on Television, DC  BAR, June 2004, at http://www.dcbar.org/
for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/june_2004/tvlawyer.cfm (citation omitted).
 L.A. Law (NBC television broadcast 1986-94).2
 Law & Order (NBC television broadcast 1990-present).3
 THE FIRM  (Paramount Pictures 1993).4
 LEGALLY BLONDE (MGM Studios 1992).5
 A  FEW  GOOD MEN (Sony Pictures 1992).6
 MY COUSIN V INNY (20th Century Fox 1992).7
 Law & Order, supra note 3.8
 “[I]t is a crude way of doing what generally can be done more effectively through9
other means.  Long before cross-examination you have ample opportunity to present
your theory of the case . . . when you are examining the jury panel, reading your
pleadings, or making an opening statement.”  ROBERT E. KEETON , TRIAL TACTICS AND
METHODS 141 (2d ed. 1973); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of Cross-
Examination: The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW  &  HUM .
BEHAV. 373 (1990).  But see F. LEE BAILEY &  HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL
TECHNIQUES FOR CRIM INAL TRIALS § 193 (1971).  Authors Bailey and Rothblatt state,
on the other hand, that “[o]ther litigators believe you should directly confront a major
witness for the other side with your own theory of the case, and ask the witness to agree
to it, even when you know the witness will not.  For example: ‘Isn’t it true that what
really happened was that my client acted in self-defense after you pulled a knife on him?’
today, from L.A. Law  and Law & Order  to The Firm  and Legally2 3 4
Blonde.   These programs and films offer conflicting images of lawyers5
to mass audiences who, due to a lack of actual courtroom experience, are
not always aware that the portrayals are fictional and glamorized.
Furthermore, legal fiction thrillers, such as books by John Grisham,
continue to fascinate American audiences while perpetuating the
“gladiator-lawyer” image.  Think of Tom Cruise cross-examining Jack
Nicholson in A Few Good Men,  or Joe Pesci running the courtroom in6
My Cousin Vinny.   Think about the defense attorney in just about any7
episode of the omnipresent television show Law & Order.   The gladiator8
is telegenic.  The gladiator is theatric.  The gladiator always gets the
answer he wants.
So, what is wrong with this picture?  Nothing . . . if it works.  In real
courtrooms with real witnesses, however, a cross-examiner who skewers
each witness with the same swashbuckling sword is likely to appear
arrogant and heartless.   When cross-examining most witnesses–innocent9
2005] CONVERSATIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION 355
Those who support this as a legitimate purpose point out that it gives you the opportunity
to preview your closing argument.”  Id. § 193.
 Some lawyers occasionally employ deliberately argumentative cross-examination10
in which they insinuate a set of facts that does not exist.  This kind of cross-examination
by innuendo has become infamous because of the offensive “Isn’t it true you really
enjoyed it?” kind of question posited to rape victims.  One attorney proudly claims that
he won an acquittal for the renowned blues singer Billie Holiday because the jury
believed her to have been framed based on questions he asked a prosecution witness,
which either obtained an objection or were stricken from the record.  See J.W. EHRLICH ,
THE LOST ART OF CROSS EXAM INATION 142-47 (1970).
 In one practitioner’s opinion,11
the most effective cross-examination is usually conducted in a courteous and
conciliatory manner. The witness is more likely to admit error to the courteous
examiner with a friendly approach than to the hard-driving examiner who firms up
the witness’s opposition.  Further, as the jurors look on cross-examination as an
unequal contest–with the advantage on the side of the lawyer–the aggressive cross-
examiner risks having the jurors disregard an admission because they feel that the
examiner violated the rules of fair play in securing it.
Howard L. Nations, Cross-Examination, § III(E)(4),  at http://www.howardnations.com/
crossexamination/cross_ex.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
bystander percipient witnesses in particular–dignity-shredding is not the
model to which attorneys should aspire.  The “gladiator” style of cross-
examination should be limited to those relatively rare situations when
the cross-examiner has a good faith belief that the witness is lying. 
As a result of media focus and public fascination with crime stories
both real and fictional, trial lawyers are widely perceived as bullies who
play fast and loose with the truth.   Every trial lawyer must thus be10
conscious of the need to present him or herself in such a way as to
dislodge that stereotype from the minds of the jurors.  Treating everyone
in the courtroom, including the witnesses, with respect and civility is the
first step toward accomplishing that goal.
Although jurors, pre-programmed by their overexposure to television
and movie lawyers, may expect a real trial lawyer to skewer every
witness on cross-examination, in practice, humiliating witnesses is rarely
an effective technique.  Why?  The main reason to avoid striving to
destroy the witness’s dignity in every cross-examination is that jurors
tend to identify with the witness in the jury box, rather than the lawyer
in the suit.   When the person enduring the cross-examination is a store11
clerk traumatized by an armed robbery, a passerby who sees a street
altercation, or a mail carrier who discovers a corpse, jurors are likely to
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 See 3 FRANCIS X. BUSCH , LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 372 (1960).12
 FRANCIS L. WELLM AN , THE ART OF CROSS-EXAM INATION  30 (4th ed. 1962).13
feel empathy, thinking, “Hey, that witness is just a regular person who
has no particular reason to lie.  That could be me up there!”  Because
most jurors will identify with the witness rather than the lawyer, they will
not react favorably if the cross-examiner humiliates their courtroom alter
ego.  Nor will a client react favorably when the folks deciding his fate
turn against his lawyer.
II.  An Alternative Model
Is there another way to cross-examine?  Visualize the conversational
cross-examiner, a charming disarmer, in place of the attack dog.  Picture
a lawyer building trust with the witness through the tone and content of
the initial questions.  Watch the lawyer first establish trust, then see the
witness let down his guard and answer the cross-examination questions
more responsively.   A lawyer who treats the witness respectfully and12
who asks controlled, leading questions without projecting hostility
succeeds in more effectively communicating the client’s position than
does the swashbuckling gladiator.
These images are not new insights.  Francis Wellman, known as the
father of modern cross-examination, explained why a more subtle
approach to cross-examination is warranted in his seminal early twentieth
century publication, The Art of Cross Examination:
[Witnesses] come to court, . . . prepared to tell what they think they know;
and in the beginning they resent an attack upon their story as they would one
upon their integrity. 
If . . . counsel’s manner is courteous and conciliatory, the witness will
soon lose the fear all witnesses have of the cross-examiner and can almost
imperceptibly be induced to enter into a discussion of his testimony in a fair
minded spirit, which, if the cross-examiner is clever, will soon disclose the
weak points in the testimony.   The sympathies of the jury are invariably on
the side of the witness, and they are quick to resent any discourtesy toward
him.  They are willing to admit his mistakes, if you can make them apparent,
but are slow to believe him guilty of perjury.13
Wellman also provided instruction for trial lawyers on how not to behave
during cross-examination:
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 Id. at 34. 14
 Roger J. Dodd & Larry S. Pozner, Controlling the Runaway Witness, 20(3) CACJ15
FORUM 33, 34 (Sept. 1993).
 See WELLM AN , supra note 13, at 66.16
 Just because lawyers are aggressive, hostile, arrogant, and sarcastic on television17
does not mean one should try to adopt such a style.  The style of an advocate’s cross-
examination will necessarily depend to a greater or lesser extent upon the natural
On the other hand, the lawyer who wearies the court and the jury with
endless and pointless cross-examinations; who is constantly losing his
temper and showing his teeth to the witnesses; who wears a sour, anxious
expression; who possesses a monotonous, rasping, penetrating voice; who
presents a slovenly, unkempt personal appearance; who is prone to take
unfair advantage of witness or counsel, and seems determined to win at all
hazards–soon prejudices a jury against himself and the client he represents,
entirely irrespective of the sworn testimony in the case.14
These words of advice are even more relevant today.
III.  Gladiator or Disarmer:  How to Choose
Choosing how to approach a witness during cross-examination is
perhaps one of the hardest tactical decisions a lawyer must make during
litigation.  However, in making that decision, it is best remembered that
a “lawyer must never show greater scorn for the witness than the jury is
currently feeling.  The jury must set the high water mark for scorn of the
witness.”   Choosing which persona to adopt when cross-examining a15
witness depends in large part on the character and demeanor of the
witness.  With witnesses such as the police inspector caught hiding
exculpatory evidence or the defendant who denies being at the scene–but
whose DNA proves him a liar–bring on the gladiator!  Those witnesses
can best be characterized as “lying dogs” or, as Francis Wellman might
have said, “willful perjurers.”  16
But, when one prepares to cross-examine a witness who has no par-
ticular interest or bias in the outcome of the trial, such as a person who
is honestly trying to describe what she saw, but from the client’s perspec-
tive has just gotten it wrong, a scornful approach will not be effective.
In those circumstances, take off the gladiator suit, put on the charming
disarming persona,  and launch a conversational cross-examination.  And17
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disposition of the examiner.  The trained advocate, however, will cultivate and employ
the style that he thinks is best calculated to produce effective results.  Speaking
generally, there are the following two prevailing styles: the savage, slashing, “hammer-
and-tongs” method of “going after a witness to make him tell the truth,” and the smiling,
soft-spoken, ingratiating method directed at lulling the witness into a sense of security
and gaining his confidence.  Neither style can be adopted to the exclusion of the other
for every situation that may be presented.  There are many situations where a vigorous,
rapid-fire examination is likely to produce the best results, just as there are many
situations where a quiet, easy, friendly examination will elicit a more favorable outcome.
The experienced advocate, like the seasoned baseball pitcher, relies upon his ability to
change the pace to suit the varying conditions in the game.  It is submitted that in most
cases, the gentler approach is better calculated to elicit the concessions the advocate
desires.  The savage, vehement style of cross-examination ordinarily makes the hostile
witness more hostile.  In some cases, such an examination angers the witness to the point
of impelling him to make vicious answers.
Although a tough approach may weaken the effect of the witness’s direct testimony
by emphasizing his partisanship and hostility, the content of the answer may be that
which leads the jury to believe that the witness is beating the examiner at his own game.
Only the complete success of such an examination will keep the examiner in the jury’s
good graces.  The repeated failure of such examinations is incalculably prejudicial.  The
witness is the “underdog,” and the jury’s sympathies are ordinarily with him.  See
BUSCH , supra note 12, § 372.
if, during the course of the conversational examination, the witness
reveals that he or she does not deserve the jury’s trust and respect, then
one can switch gears and become a gladiator, and the jurors will be right
there for the ride.
IV.  Steps Toward Effective Cross-Examination
A.  Step One, Know Yourself
Preparation for any cross-examination requires a realistic appraisal
of one’s own courtroom persona.  How will you come across to others
in the courtroom setting?  How would you describe your personality if
you were to be honest and objective?  Are you fearless?  Are you the
natural center of attention in any gathering?  Or, would you more
accurately be described as low key and self-deprecating? 
Whatever your personality, you can work with it and be a successful
cross-examiner.  Authenticity is persuasive, and dishonesty is generally
transparent.  Jurors will see through any hasty attempt to don a new
personality for the courtroom.  It is better to focus on projecting your best
2005] CONVERSATIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION 359
 All trial advocacy textbooks agree that preparation is the key to courtroom success.18
See THOM AS A. MAUET, TRIALS: STRATEGY , SKILLS, AND THE NEW  POWER OF
PERSUASIO N  (2005); L. T IM OTHY PERRIN ET AL., THE ART &  SCIENCE OF TRIAL
ADVOCACY (2003).
real self, rather than trying cosmetic alterations.  If you have a more
forceful personality, you may have to rein yourself in a bit to accomplish
a conversational cross-examination.  It is useful to remind yourself that
you can be assertive without projecting hostility.
B.  Step Two, Know Your Case
Preparation for every cross-examination requires knowing one’s case
well.  Know everything the witness said on previous occasions.  Know
when and to whom the witness spoke.  Know everything other witnesses
have said about the same subjects.  Know everything about the witness’s
background.  There is simply no substitution for preparation, reviewing
all the known facts, and investigating the unknown prior to cross-examin-
ation.   Part of knowing the case is analyzing the role each witness plays18
in the opposition case and determining the most effective attitude to
project toward the witness.  Is this witness one of those “lying dogs” or
just someone who got it wrong?  The answer to that question will invari-
ably affect the decision as to how to cross-examine the witness.
To begin preparation for cross-examination, list the elements of the
crimes charged or the causes of action alleged and see where this wit-
ness’s likely testimony on direct fits into the opposition case.  Look at
all the discovery gathered concerning this witness and the witness’s story.
Check to see what fits and what does not.  Make sure discovery includes
information about the witness’s criminal history. Investigate other aspects
of the witness’s background thoroughly. Why is the other side calling
this witness?  What will this testimony prove?  What is your theory of
the witness?  How does the witness fit into your overarching theory of
the case?  Do you think the witness is lying and deliberately out to frame
your client?  If not, yet the witness makes damaging statements against
your client, what is the explanation?  Has the witness been deliberately
misled?  Or is the witness simply mistaken or confused?  Answers to
these questions will help form your choice of questioning style: the gladi-
ator for the liars and the conversational cross-examiner for everyone else.
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 Some examples include:19
You are the chief financial officer of the corporation?
You oversee all the financial operations for the corporation?
That is a big job, is it not?
I mean, your work carries with it enormous responsibility?
You certainly have to rely on support from others?
Ms. Abrams, my client, worked for you since the year 2000, is that right?
She was your personal assistant?
She held that position for a year?
You were her direct supervisor?
You wrote an evaluation of her work?
That was in August of 2001?
You wrote the evaluation yourself?
You did not delegate that task to anyone else?
And you wrote it based on your own observations of Ms. Abrams’ work?
Her work was “outstanding” (quoting verbatim from the evaluation), is that not right?
V.  Cross-Examination: What to Ask 
The toughest question for new lawyers is: “About what should I cross-
examine?”  Avoid the temptation to repeat the substance of the direct
examination on cross-examination, hoping the witness will give different
answers.  Instead, comb through the witness’s prior statements looking
for points that corroborate your theory of the case.  Focus on statements
the witness has made in the past that both support your case theory and
simultaneously translate to a failure of proof for the other side.  These
are likely to be points that one’s opponent either does not need or want
to bring out on direct.  Work this area up into a set of questions.
Conversational cross-examination best begins by asking questions to
which the witness readily acquiesces.  These areas of agreement are a
good place to begin one’s cross-examination.  One can develop rapport
with the witness by asking these questions in a non-threatening tone of
voice and in a form to which the witness can easily agree.19
Look for omissions or holes in the witness’s stories.  Think about
pieces of the witness’s story that do not ring true or that do not pass the
“common sense” test.  These are points one should surely raise during
cross-examination in order to weaken one’s opponent’s case.  Flesh out
inconsistencies by checking the witness’s prior statements, other wit-
nesses’ statements, and conflicts with ordinary common sense.  Develop
a theory of the witness by thinking simultaneously about  how best to use
your opponent’s witness to support your case. 
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Cross-examination is the opportunity for the trial lawyer to lay the
foundation for summation.  In planning for cross-examination, one must
think ahead to the closing argument.  How are you going to describe this
witness to the jury?  What are you going to argue about the witness’s
contribution to the case?  How are you going to characterize the signifi-
cance of this testimony?  Ask questions that will provide the foundation
for summarizing the witness’s testimony in such a way that it would
appear that the witness actually testified favorably for your client. 
Once you have determined both the witness’s place in your case theory
and what to say to the jury about this witness, make sure that you have
established the necessary points during cross-examination.  An elegant
closing argument pulls the case together for the jury.  If you have
conducted a well-designed cross-examination, you will have established
each of the points needed to get your theory of the witness across to the
jury.  Then, when you stand to deliver your summation, you will simply
be “connecting the dots” established on cross-examination.  It is through
this process that you put an effective “theory of the case” spin on each
witness’s testimony.
VI.  Empathize With the Witness
In order to effectively connect with a witness during cross-examina-
tion, start by standing in the witness’s shoes.  If you, as the cross-
examiner, have a good faith belief that the witness’s testimony on direct
is inaccurate, then view it as your task to help the jury understand how
the witness managed to get it wrong.  Think about the witness’s experi-
ence in this case.  Try to understand how and why the witness misunder-
stood or misinterpreted the facts.  Review the evidence to deduce the
series of events that led the witness to erroneous conclusions.  Everything
that occurred between the witness’s original observations and the
appearance in court to testify is a potential area of inquiry and, therefore,
fair game for cross-examination.  Plan a series of questions designed to
explain to the jury just how the witness arrived at those “wrongheaded”
conclusions.
When preparing your cross-examination questions, incorporate what
is known about memory.  A large body of social science research over
the last thirty-five years has determined that witnesses can “get it wrong”
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 Professor Elizabeth Loftus, University of California at Irvine, has conducted20
studies of human memory for more than thirty years.  Her body of work dates back to
a book she co-authored in 1976, HUMAN MEM ORY : THE PROCESSING OF INFORM ATION .
Professor Loftus makes the case that eyewitness testimony is often unreliable and that
false memories may be triggered by post-event suggestion.  GEOFFREY R. LOFTUS &
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, HUMAN M EM ORY : THE PROCESSING OF INFORM ATION 159-63
(1976).  Many of her publications are available at http://www.seweb.uci.edu/faculty/
loftus.
 Professor Gary Wells, Iowa State University, is a scientific psychology scholar.21
His studies of the fallibility of eyewitness memory are widely cited.  He has researched
social and cognitive psychology related to the interface of psychology and the law.
Much of his work has been directed at eyewitness testimony, with an emphasis on how
to improve the accuracy of such testimony.  In addition, his work examines judgment
and decision-making processes in such domains as perceived likelihood, perceived
causality, and judgments of regret.  For more information on Professor Wells or on
“eyewitness memory issues,” see http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/
homepage.htm.
 Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events,22
in 11 COM PREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY (FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY) 149, 149
(A.M. Goldstein et al., eds. 2003), available at http://www.reporterx.net/en/default
.asp?id=2&mnu=2).
for a variety of reasons.  Experts, such as psychologists Elizabeth Loftus20
and Gary Wells,  have concluded that memory is fallible.  Pitfalls to21
accurate recollection occur at the following three different stages in the
process: acquisition, storage, and retrieval.  Many inhibitors, such as
inattention, shock, focus on a weapon, et cetera, prevent witnesses from
perceiving events accurately from the start.  Other factors can result in
contamination of stored memories and interfere with accurate retrieval
of those memories.  Viewing memory as vulnerable–analogous to other
forms of physical evidence–the effective cross-examiner should explore
the witness’s memory of a traumatic event carefully.  “Like physical
evidence, memory trace evidence can be contaminated, lost, destroyed,
or otherwise made to produce results that can lead to an incorrect
reconstruction of the event in question.  Like physical trace evidence, the
manner in which memory trace evidence is collected can have important
consequences for the accuracy of the results.”  22
When creating a list of possible areas of cross-examination, review
any available information regarding the witness, the circumstances under
which the initial observations were made, and the circumstances under
which the witness’s statements to others were taken.  By putting one’s
self in the witness’s shoes, one will be able to determine a theory
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 Professor Irving Younger authored the original Ten Commandments of Cross-23
Examination: (1) be brief, (2) use plain words, (3) use only leading questions, (4) be
prepared, (5) listen, (6) do not quarrel, (7) avoid repetition, (8) disallow witness ex-
planation, (9) limit questioning, and (10) save the ultimate point for summation.  Irving
Younger, The Art of Cross-Examination, 1976 A.B.A. SEC. ON LITIG , MONOGRAPH
SERIES NO . 1, available at http://www.nebarfnd.org/PDFS/10commandments .pdf; see
also Timothy A. Pratt, The Ten Commandments of Cross-Examination, available at
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/Pratt-SP03.htm.
concerning the testimony.  Is the witness simply mistaken?  Or, is the
witness filling in details, perhaps unconsciously, with information that
has altered the original perceptions?  Was the witness confused by the
number of events competing for attention during the witness’s initial
observation?  Has the witness been misled by investigators or others
connected with one’s opponent’s case?
VII.  Honing Your Scope
Renowned evidence professor, the late Irving Younger, said it best
when he said, “You should never try to make more than three points on
cross-examination.  Two points are better than three and one point is
better than two.”   After gathering all the information described above,23
in keeping with Professor Younger’s first commandment of brevity, take
the list of potential cross-examination points and narrow it down.
Identify the strongest and the safest points.  Put the rest aside. 
When contemplating the most sensible cross-examination approach,
use the following guiding principles:
1. Each cross-examination point must not only be consistent with, but
should also advance your case theory and theme.  (For example,
when the defense to a sexual assault charge is alibi, do not cross-
examine on the issue of consent.)
2. Avoid points that are too subtle or too vague; stick with points you
can make understandable to the jury.  In other words, limit your
cross-examination points to those likely to make a strong impact
on the jury.
3. Ask yourself whether you should cross-examine at all.  Did the
witness hurt your case?  Will the jury be disappointed and reach
a negative conclusion if you do not cross-examine?  Can you argue
your witness theory without cross-examining?  Will your cross-
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 W ILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 2, sc. 2.24
 THE POLICE, Every Breath You Take, on SYNCHRONICITY  (A&M 1983).25
examination advance your case theory?  Evaluate the risk that any
cross-examination might alienate the jurors.
4. Limit the number of points you set out to make.  Judges and juries
have limited attention spans.  In order to maximize your audience’s
focus, remember the following mantra: get in, get out, sit down.
This does not mean that you must make that one point quickly.  In
fact, in order to make sure the jury understands where you are
going, take your time, and ask several short, one topic questions
to make sure you clearly establish each point.
VIII.  Organizing
Order the points you wish to make.  Use logic but do not repeat the
logic of the direct, which is generally chronological.  If the witness has
information helpful to your case, start there.  Always elicit all helpful
facts before attempting to impeach the witness, even if you are doing it
conversationally.  End with a strong but totally safe point.
IX.  Implementing Conversational
Cross-Examination
Following are some techniques for maintaining witness control
without browbeating, and some ideas regarding ways to discredit witness
testimony without (necessarily) discrediting the witness.
Present yourself professionally but without arrogance.  Remember,
“all the world’s a stage,”  and this premise is magnified in the courtroom.24
The line “[e]very move you make, every step you take, [someone is]
watching you”  is doubly true in the courtroom.  When deciding how25
they feel about you and by extension, your client’s case, jurors take
everything into consideration.  So, greet the clerk and bailiff with a smile
and friendly word; treat everyone, including your client, with respect.
Convey an attitude that is respectful and genial but one that indicates
awareness of the seriousness of the case.  Strive to communicate your
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theory of the witness with a unified approach; use attitude, tone, and the
content of your questions to establish your point of view regarding the
witness.
Present yourself respectfully.  If you have a tattoo on your midsection,
no one in the courtroom should be aware of it.  However you dress, it
should not distract from your presentation.  Give thought to what you
wear, your tone of voice, your attitude, the way you phrase your ques-
tions, and your word choice, in light of the following five factors:  (1)
Who are you and what is your own range of styles? (2) Who is the
witness and how does he or she present? (3) Who are your jurors? (4)
Who is the judge? and (5) Who is opposing counsel?
Stand when you cross-examine.  Standing demonstrates respect for
the witness, for the jurors, and for the process.  It also makes you look
bigger, which for most trial lawyers, at least those who could not be
described as tall, silver-haired, and majestic, is an important advantage.
Standing also communicates “the focus is on me now.”  And, on those
rare occasions when your initial conversational cross-examination has
convinced the jury that a witness should be moved from the “mistaken”
to the “lying dog” category, you can indicate your disdain for the witness
by sitting down and resuming questioning from your seat, further
diminishing the witness in the jury’s eyes.
Lead, lead, lead.  All cross-examination questions should be leading,
but leading is not synonymous with hostility.  Be firm and assertive, but
save hostility for those times when the witness clearly invites it.  Do not
ask questions that cede control to the witness; never ask an open-ended
question.  Avoid characterizations with which the witness might not
agree, such as, “Wouldn’t you agree that it was dumb to do what you
did?”  Do not ask for explanations; do not ask that “ultimate” question.
Save that for closing argument.
Relax the witness.  Get the witness in the habit of agreeing with you.
Start with simple questions that you know will get you easy “yes” or “no”
answers.
Formulate short, concise, one-fact questions.  The shorter the question,
the greater the cross-examiner’s control over the witness.  A short, one-
topic question helps focus the witness on one point and avoids argument.
Formulate questions by making brief declarative statements, and use your
voice to indicate that you are asking the witness to ratify his agreement.
Signify that your “statement” is a question by raising your voice at the
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end.  If you take the witness through a point one tiny, ultra-brief question
at a time, you will provide the jurors with enough time to fully absorb
the point you are making.  
Consider the following example: The witness identified your client
in a physical lineup ten days after the crime.  This witness may not be
lying, but, according to your theory of the case, he is simply wrong.
During cross-examination, your goal is to establish that he did not
actually see the perpetrator’s face at the time of the crime.  Doing so, you
will prove what you need in order to argue in summation that there is no
factual basis for the identification.
Q: It was December 24th? 
A: It was. 
Q: It was raining? 
A: Yes.
Q: You were on your way to a party?
A: Yes, a birthday party.
Q: It was about 10:00 p.m.?
A: Yes.
Q: It was dark?
A: Yes.
Q: You were riding your bike? 
A: Yes.
Q: You rode through the park? 
A: Yes.
Q: Forgive me for asking, but no helmet? 
A: Yes, no helmet.
Q: And no lights on your bike? 
A: That is right.
Q: And no overhead lighting either?
A: Correct.
Q: You heard a shot? 
A: Yes, I did.
Q: You were startled?
A: Of course.
Q: Scared?
A: Yes, I would say so.
Q: You fell off your bike?
A: Yes.
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Q: You hit your head?
A: Yes.
Q: You saw someone running?
A: Yes.
Q: Running away from you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you watched him run away?
A: Yes.
Q: He did not turn around?
A: No.
Q: You only saw him from the back?
A: Yes.
The cross-examiner has not attacked the witness’s integrity but instead
has led the witness to implicitly undermine the validity of the original
testimony.  By reorganizing and restating certain facts, the cross-exam-
ination succeeds in calling the identification into question.  This example
permits one to argue in closing argument that the witness’s identification
of the client on direct examination is simply wrong.  The cross-examina-
tion showed that the witness never saw the perpetrator’s face, so his
identification of the client could not have been based on personal knowl-
edge of the facts. 
Avoid asking questions when you do not know the answer.  Do not ask
if you do not know.  Protect yourself by relying on certain information.
Index every statement to its source. Whenever possible, use the witness’s
verbatim language from prior statements in your questions.
Maintain constant eye contact with the witness.  Why? Because if you
do not, the witness (or the jury) will notice.  Strong eye contact is a non-
verbal signal that the examiner will not allow deviations from the ques-
tion and answer approach.  The jurors are watching the cross-examiner.
They will notice sustained eye contact, and they will understand that you
have “locked in” the witness.  “Locking in” a witness reflects confidence
in the cross-examination, and eye contact keeps the jury’s attention on
your confidence. 
Maintain control by listening to the answers.  Unlike lawyers on
television, cross-examiners should have written notes–though they should
not be wed to them.  If you cannot let go of your notes, you will find it
impossible to maintain control through eye contact, and you will not be
able to “go with the flow.”  So, do have a written plan but be flexible.
The conversational cross-examiner prepares to cross-examine, but does
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not prepare the actual cross-examination word for word.  Listening to the
answers also helps the examiner prevent evasion and can aid in accurate
impeachment.
Repeat the question.  When the witness is not following the program,
maintain your cool.  Say, “Thank you for that answer, but my question
was . . .” and repeat the question.  Maintain eye contact, take your time,
lean forward slightly, and using exactly the same words and tone, repeat
the question, only more slowly.  This technique alerts the jury to the fact
that the witness was being evasive.
Reversal I: Ask, Reverse, Ask.
Q: The car was blue?
A: The car zoomed through the red light so fast I did not even see
brake lights . . .
Q: The car was NOT blue?
A: No, I did not say that.
Q: The car was blue?
A: Yes.
Reversal II: Ask, Repeat, Reverse.
Q: The car was blue?
A: The car zoomed through the red light . . . 
Q: The car was blue?
A: (Mumble, mumble, mumble.)
Q: The car was NOT blue?
A: No, I did not say that.
Q: The car was blue?
Use the witness’s full name.
Q: The car was blue?
A: The car zoomed through the red light . . . 
Q: John Jacob Jingleheimer Schmitt, the car was blue, was it not? 
A: Yes, it was.
Turn to the Court Reporter.  Ask the court reporter, “Will you please
read the last question back to the witness?”  It takes time for the reporter
to find the correct testimony.  Jurors treat court reporters as part of the
official power structure in the courtroom.  The wait, the silence, and
finally the official voice rereading the question all may help intimidate
the witness into responsiveness.
Be the Traffic Cop.  Step forward with your right hand raised.  Say,
“Excuse me, but I do not think you understood my question.  What I was
asking was . . . (repeat question).”  If opposing counsel objects for
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 See generally Dodd & Pozner, supra note 15, at 33-37.26
interrupting, apologize to the court, jury, et cetera.  This technique is
likely to serve the purpose of throwing witnesses intent on not answering
the questions off their stride.  Then ask the question again, making it
tighter if possible.
So, your answer is “yes?”  During a long, non-responsive answer,
maintain eye contact with the witness and smile slightly.  Then, when
the witness has finished, lean forward, still smiling, and say, “So, your
answer is “yes?”
Spontaneous Loop Using Witness’s Own Language.  This technique
is best described by the following example of cross-examination after
the officer testifies on direct: “I stopped [your client] because he matched
the description I was given.”
Q: The description you had was a black man driving a green Porsche?
A: Yes.
Q: My client, Mr. X, is a black man?
A: That is right.
Q: But the car he was driving was white, was it not?
A: Yes.
Q: Not green?
A: That is right, it was white.
Q: And the car you were looking for was a Porsche, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: My client was driving a Toyota?
A: He was.
Q: So you were looking for a Black man in a green Porsche? 
A: Yes.
Q: And you stopped a Black man in a white Toyota?
A: Yes.
Q: And for you, Officer, that was a match?
A: Close enough for government work.
Q: So, what you are telling us, Officer, is that as long as it was a Black
man driving a car, that is “close enough for government work”?
A: [Whatever he says, it does not matter.]
Last resort approaches.  Eye contact, attentive listening, and patient
repetition may be more effective than other techniques used to maintain
witness control, such as asking for the judge to intervene.   When a26
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witness persists in obstreperous behavior, however, one can politely ask
the judge to “please instruct the witness to answer the question.”  This
is a last resort, because calling upon the judge for help may weaken the
examiner’s position, making it look as if one has lost control of the
situation.  Sometimes, however, asking for the judge’s intervention is the
only thing one can do to protect the record and avoid waiving the error.
Another last resort technique is to cut the witness off.  “Excuse me,
Mr. Witness, but my question was . . .”  This may seem rude and signal
to the jury that you do not want it to hear something the witness has to
say, but it also highlights the fact that the witness was dodging the
question.  Be careful; a clever opponent may portray your technique as
rudeness by objecting and asking the judge to permit the witness to finish
his answer.  Such an objection will suggest to the jury that you lost
control of the witness.
When you must protect the record against the rantings of a very unruly
witness, make the objection “non-responsive,” and ask that everything
after “yes” be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard the witness’s
answer.  Again, proceed with caution.  Objecting to a witness during your
own cross-examination clearly demonstrates loss of witness control.
X.  Conclusion
When questioning each witness, the cross-examiner’s goals are simple:
communicate one’s theory of the case and make the points needed to set
up an effective closing argument regarding the witness.  The conversa-
tional approach feels more natural to many trial lawyers than does the
gladiator approach.  A trial lawyer who feels more natural in the
courtroom comes across as more authentic and believable to jurors.  By
projecting respect and understanding, the cross-examiner will be more
likely to win jurors’ trust.  Once jurors accept the fact that the trial lawyer
is a human being rather than a television actor, they may be willing to
let go of those negative lawyer stereotypes that abound in popular culture.
They may even open their minds and listen.  It is always wise to
remember that, even in this high-tech world of media saturation, bells,
whistles, and pyrotechnics, lawyers do not render verdicts.  Jurors do.
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 This appendix provides general case law from all fifty states regarding cross-27
examination. The research does not address state rules, statutory or otherwise, governing




General Purpose:  Madden v. State, 112 So. 2d 796, 799 (Ala. Ct. App. 1959) (“It is
the clear right of the cross-examining party to elicit facts which weaken or qualify the
case of the party examining in chief, or support the case of the cross-examining party.
One of its chief functions is to test the credibility of the deposing witness.”).
Scope of Cross-Examination: Hart v. State, 852 So. 2d 839, 844 (Ala. Crim. App.
2002) (“[A] party should be given ‘wide latitude on cross-examination to test a witness’s
partiality, bias, intent, credibility, or prejudice, or to impeach, illustrate, or test the
accuracy of the witness’s testimony or recollection as well as the extent of his knowl-
edge.’” (citation omitted)). But see Brooks v. State, 418 So. 2d 195, 197 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982) (“Although it is permissible to interrogate a witness on cross-examination
about irrelevant matters in order to test his memory or power of observation, the latitude
of the questioning rests ‘largely, if not exclusively within the sound discretion of the
trial court.’” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Smith v. State, No. CR-97-1258, 2000 WL 1868419, at *53
(Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2000) (“An accused in a criminal prosecution cannot be
required to take the stand as a witness, but if he elects to do so, . . . he is subject to cross-
examination-just like any other witness.  An accused who takes the stand in his own
defense may be fully cross-examined as to any inconsistency or implausibility of his
testimony-in-chief, and as to matters directed to testing his recollection, motive, and
credibility.” (citations omitted)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Ex Parte Smith, No.
1010267, 2003 WL 1145475 (Ala. Mar. 14, 2003).
Valuable Right: Akin v. State, 698 So. 2d 228, 236 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (“The right
of cross-examination, thorough and sifting, belongs to every party as to the witnesses
called against him.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  Gober v. Khalaf, 628 So. 2d 416, 417 (Ala. 1993) (“[T]he general rule
is that a witness may not be impeached on a collateral matter.  A fact is collateral if it
is ‘admissible neither upon an issue under the pleadings of the case nor for the purpose
of impeaching the witness’ credibility in some means other than inconsistency.’” (cita-
tions omitted)); Williams v. Lide, 628 So. 2d 531, 538 (Ala. 1993) (“‘[I]mpeaching testi-
mony’ is ‘designed to discredit a witness’ by showing ‘why faith should not be accorded
to his testimony’ and that it consists of evidence ‘attacking the character, motives, in-
tegrity or veracity of the witness.’” (citation omitted)); Pope & Quint, Inc. v. Davis, 485
So. 2d 1134, 1137 (Ala. 1986) (concluding that impeachment of a witness by deposition
should be allowed provided that “a proper foundation was laid and that proffered
evidence was related to a material issue”).
ALASKA
Valuable Right: Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916, 931 (Alaska 1977) (“[I]t
is generally recognized that cross-examination is a basic right and should be given
considerable leeway.”).
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ARIZONA
General Purpose: State v. Perez, 442 P.2d 125, 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) (“Cross
examination only goes to indicate the truthfulness of testimony by indicating honesty
and integrity of witnesses, their ability to observe accurately at the time an event
occurred, and the accuracy of recollection of past events.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases: State v. Woody, 496 P.2d 584, 587 (Ariz. 1972) (“A defend-
ant in a criminal action cannot be required to be a witness, but if he elects to testify he
may be cross-examined to the same extent and is subject to the same rules as any other
witness.” (citations omitted)).
Scope of Cross: State v. Torres, 400 P.2d 843, 845 (Ariz. 1965) (“[A] cross-examiner
should be given great latitude in his questions which seek to impeach an adverse witness
being examined . . . .” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right: State v. Taggart, 925 P.2d 710, 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (“The right
to cross-examine a witness is a vital part of confrontation.  However, cross-examination
may be restricted based on concerns for harassment, prejudice, or marginal relevance.
The balance between these competing interests hinges on whether the defendant was
denied the opportunity to present information bearing on the issues in the case or on
the credibility of a witness.” (citations omitted)), vacated sub nom. State v. Riggs, 942
P.2d 1159 (Ariz. 1997).
Impeachment: State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105, 1118 (Ariz. 1983) (“Evidence which
tests, sustains, or impeaches the credibility or character of a witness is generally admis-
sible.” (citation omitted)); State v. Munguia, 668 P.2d 912, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)
(“[A] party is not allowed to impeach a witness on collateral matters.  The right to
confront witnesses . . . does not, however, confer the right to impeach a witness as to
specific events that are not relevant to the issues at trial.” (citations omitted)).
ARKANSAS
General Purpose:  Farr v. Henson, 84 S.W.3d 871, 876 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (“Cross-
examination serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said in order to develop
facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner.  Its objects include weakening or
disproving his adversary’s case, breaking down his testimony in chief, testing his
veracity, accuracy, and honesty, and exhibiting the improbabilities of his testimony.”
(citations omitted)).
Scope of Cross: Klimas v. State, 534 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Ark. 1976) (“An accused
should be accorded a wide latitude in cross-examination to impeach the credibility of
a witness against him.  The latitude of this right of cross-examination is even broader
and that of the court’s discretion to limit it is somewhat narrower than in other instances.
This is particularly so when the witness is, or may be found to be, an accomplice.”
(citations omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases: James v. State, 658 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Ark. 1983) (“‘Where
an accused takes the stand in his own behalf he subjects himself to the same rules of
cross-examination as any other witness.’” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  Echols v. State, 936 S.W.2d 509, 540 (Ark. 1996) (“A witness always
puts his credibility at issue when he takes the stand.” (citation omitted)); Hoback v. State,
689 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Ark. 1985) (“The scope of cross-examination to impeach is not
generally limited to matters brought out on direct examination.  Cross-examination
should be limited to material and relevant matters before the court.” (citations omitted)).
CALIFORNIA
General Purpose:  Fost v. Super. Ct., 80 Cal. App. 4th 724, 733 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating
that the two purposes of cross-examination are “‘to test the credibility, knowledge and
recollection of the witness’” and “‘to elicit additional evidence’” (citations omitted)).
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Scope of Cross: Kovacs v. Sturgeon, 274 Cal. App. 2d 478, 486 (Ct. App. 1969)
(“[W]ide latitude is permitted on cross-examination to determine the facts and the truth
of testimony given on direct examination.” (citations omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  People v. Zambrano, 124 Cal. App. 4th 228, 240 (Ct. App.
2004) (“When a defendant voluntarily testifies, the prosecutor ‘may fully amplify his
testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or
by introducing evidence through cross-examination which explains or refutes his state-
ments or the inferences which may necessarily be drawn from them.’” (citation omit-
ted)).
Valuable Right:  People v. Zammora, 152 P.2d 180, 225-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944)
(“[C]ross-examination has long been regarded as a powerful weapon for ascertaining
the truth, and should be extended liberally. . . . To deny a fair latitude in cross-
examination is to impair one of the essential safeguards to a fair trial.”).
Impeachment: People v. Harrison, 106 P.3d 895, 909 (Cal. 2005) (“In determining the
credibility of a witness, the jury may consider, among other things, ‘[t]he extent of his
capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matter about which he testifies,’
‘[t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive,’ and the witness’s
‘attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the giving of testimony.’”
(citations omitted)); Zambrano, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 240 (“‘Unless precluded by statute,
any evidence is admissible to attack the credibility of a witness if it will establish a fact
that has a tendency in reason to disprove the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony.
. . .’” (citation omitted)).
COLORADO
General Purpose:  People v. Liggett, 114 P.3d 85, 87 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (“Cross-
examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth
of his or her testimony are tested, and it should be liberally extended to permit a
thorough inquiry into the motives of the witnesses.” (citation omitted)), cert. granted
in part by No. 05SC142, 2005 WL 1323283 (Colo. June 6, 2005).
Scope of Cross:  People v. Sallis, 857 P.2d 572, 574 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (“[C]ross-
examination should be limited to subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting the credibility of the witness.” (citation omitted)). But see Combined
Commc’ns Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 865 P.2d 893, 899 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(“There is no right . . . to cross-examine on a collateral matter for impeachment or for
any other purpose.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  People v. Garcia, 981 P.2d 214, 216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998)
(“When a criminal defendant testifies as a witness in his or her own behalf, he or she
is subject to the general rules of examination applicable to other witnesses, including
examination on matters that bear on credibility.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Huggins v. Campbell, 274 P.2d 324, 328 (Colo. 1954) (remarking
that the “right of cross-examination unquestionably is a valuable right”).
Impeachment:  People v. Wilkinson, 555 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976)
(“Unless the relevancy of impeaching evidence is plain, it should not be admitted, and
evidence tending to raise collateral questions and to divert the attention of the jury should
be excluded.” (citations omitted)).  But see Lawrence v. Taylor, 8 P.3d 607, 611 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2000) (“The relevancy of impeaching evidence must be clear, must not raise
collateral issues, and must be directed only at the witness’ credibility, and not at the
witness’ moral character.” (citation omitted)).
CONNECTICUT
General Purpose:  State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1183 (Conn. 2004) (“‘[C]ross-
examination is the principal means by which the credibility of witnesses and the truth
of their testimony is tested.’” (citations omitted)).
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Scope of Cross:  State v. Palladino, 796 A.2d 577, 582 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (“The
‘cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’
perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to
impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.’” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Crosby, 654
A.2d 371, 377 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (“Cross-examination to elicit facts tending to show
lack of veracity is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted.  That right is not
absolute and is subject to reasonable limitation.” (citations omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Denson, 789 A.2d 1075, 1085 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)
(“‘[A] defendant who elects to testify in his own behalf is subject to cross-examination
and impeachment just as is any witness . . . .’” (citations omitted in original)); see also
State v. Cassidy, 672 A.2d 899, 908 (Conn. 1996) (“[W]hen the defendant elected to
testify, he placed his credibility in issue, thereby subjecting himself to cross-examination
under ‘the same rules and tests which could by law be applied to other witnesses.’”
(citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Gordon v. Indusco Mgmt. Corp., 320 A.2d 811, 818 (Conn. 1973)
(“The right of cross-examination is not a privilege but is an absolute right and if one
is deprived of a complete cross-examination he has a right to have the direct testimony
stricken.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Abernathy, 806 A.2d 1139, 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (“‘The
offering party must establish the relevancy of impeachment evidence by laying a proper
foundation . . . which may be established in one of three ways: (1) by making an offer
of proof; (2) the record independently may establish the relevance of the proffered
evidence; or (3) stating a good faith belief that there is an adequate factual basis for [the]
inquiry.’” (citations omitted in original)); see also State v. Webb, 817 A.2d 122, 131
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (“‘The capacity of a witness to observe, recollect and narrate an
occurrence is a proper subject of inquiry on cross-examination.’” (citation omitted)).
DELAWARE
General Purpose:  Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1218-19 (Del. 2002) (“‘It is the
essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner’ in putting
the weight of the witnesses’ testimony and credibility to a test so that the jury can fairly
appraise them.” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross: Martin v. State, 346 A.2d 158, 160 (Del. 1975) (“[T]here is a wide
discretion given to counsel during cross-examination as he tests, among other things,
the credibility of a witness as well as his ability to observe, remember and relate.”).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 753 (Del. 2003)
(“[W]here a defendant decides to ‘cast aside the cloak of immunity’ and ‘take the stand
in his own behalf, he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of appropriate
rules, he may be cross-examined as to the facts in issue.’” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Jackson v. State, 770 A.2d 506, 515 (Del. 2001) (“Effective cross-
examination is essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” (citations omitted)).
Impeachment: Jackson, 770 A.2d at 515 (“Under Delaware law, ‘the jury is the sole
trier of fact, responsible for determining witness credibility and resolving conflicts in
testimony.’ Jurors should have every opportunity to hear impeachment evidence that
may undermine a witness’ credibility.” (citations omitted)).  But see Trump v. State,
753 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. 2000) (“[W]hen evaluating the admissibility of evidence for
impeachment, the trial judge should consider, among other things, the risk of ‘harass-
ment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or marginally relevant.’” (citations omitted)).
FLORIDA
General Purpose:  Bordelon v. State, 908 So. 2d 543, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(“‘Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and
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the truth of his testimony are tested.’” (citation omitted)); see also Steinhorst v. State,
412 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982) (“The proper purposes of cross-examination are: (1)
to weaken, test, or demonstrate the impossibility of the testimony of the witness on direct
examination and, (2) to impeach the credibility of the witness, which may involve,
among other things, showing his possible interest in the outcome of the case.” (citations
omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 195 (Fla. 1997) (“All witnesses
who testify during a trial place their credibility in issue.  Regardless of subject matter
of witness’ testimony, a party on cross-examination may inquire into matters that affect
the truthfulness of the witness’ testimony.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Johnson v. State, 380 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 1979) (“A
criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own behalf or to refuse to testify.  Once
he becomes a witness, however, he may be examined the same as other witnesses on
matters which illuminate the quality of his testimony.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Mendez v. State, 412 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“The
right of full cross-examination is absolute, and the denial of that right may easily
constitute reversible error.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  Del Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon, 466 So. 2d 1167, 1171 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.  1985) (“[A] party is given wide latitude in attacking the credibility of the
opposing party’s witnesses . . . .”); see also Tacy v. Kellner, 697 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“A witness’ credibility may always be impeached.” (citation
omitted)); Williams v. State, 443 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (“[A]
wide range of cross-examination is permitted to impeach the credibility of a witness.”
(citation omitted)).  But see Johnson v. State, 178 So. 2d 724, 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (“Where it is sought to impeach a witness on the basis of testimony given on
cross-examination, the testimony must, of course, be relevant and material, and the test
of relevancy and materiality is whether the cross-examining party could have, for any
purpose other than impeachment, introduced evidence on the subject in chief.” (citations
omitted)).
GEORGIA
General Purpose: Bowen v. State, 556 S.E.2d 252, 253 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“Cross-
examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth
of his testimony are tested.” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  James v. State, 580 S.E.2d 334, 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[I]t is better
that cross-examination should be too free than too much restricted.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Sammons v. State, 612 S.E.2d 785, 789 (Ga. 2005) (“A
defendant who testifies is subject to cross-examination just as any other witness.
Accordingly, a defendant may be impeached by proof of contradictory statements.”
(citations omitted)); see also Blevins v. State, 606 S.E.2d 624, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
(“‘The State, like any other party, has the right to conduct a thorough and sifting cross-
examination and to pursue the specifics of a topic [the defendant] introduced.” (citation
omitted in original)).
Valuable Right:  Craft v. State, 618 S.E.2d 104, 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (“The right
of cross-examination is a substantial right, the preservation of which is essential to the
proper administration of justice and extends to all matters within the knowledge of the
witness, the disclosure of which is material to the controversy.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  W. Marietta Hardware v. Chandler, 489 S.E.2d 584, 587 (Ga. Ct. App.
1997) (“‘[A] party may show anything which in the slightest degree affects the credit
of an opposing witness.  A witness may be impeached on a collateral issue which is
indirectly material to the issue in the case.” (citations omitted in original)); see also
Snelling v. State, 450 S.E.2d 299, 301 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“‘Wherever the purpose
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is to impeach or discredit the witness, great latitude should be allowed by the court in
cross examinations.” (citation omitted)).
HAWAII
Scope of Cross:  State v. Corella, 900 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (“The
scope of cross-examination is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . .
However, a witness may be cross-examined on matters bearing upon the witness’
credibility, biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives.” (citations omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. McElroy, 97 P.3d 1004, 1009 (Haw. 2004) (“[A]n
accused may be cross-examined as to all matters which he himself has brought up on
direct examination.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Culkin, 35 P.3d 233, 247-48
(Haw. 2001) (“‘A defendant who elects to testify in his own defense is subject to cross-
examination as to any matter pertinent to, or having a logical connection with the
specific offense for which he is being tried.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right: Kekua v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 601 P.2d 364, 372 (Haw. 1979) (“The
right to cross-examine a witness, although subject to waiver, is a fundamental right that
is basic to our judicial system.” (citations omitted)).
Impeachment: State v. Jones, 617 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Haw. 1980) (“A witness may be
cross-examined, and testimony elicited, upon matters bearing upon his credibility.  But
the testimonial evidence sought to be adduced must fairly bear upon his capacity for
truth and veracity.”); see also Asato v. Furtado, 474 P.2d 288, 294 (Haw. 1970) (“In
every instance where a witness is sought to be impeached, the only issue that arises is
whether the witness is telling the truth. . . .  Therefore, any evidence adduced on this
issue, in order to be relevant at all, must go to the issue of truth and veracity.”).
IDAHO
General Purpose:  State v. Mundell, 158 P.2d 818, 822 (Idaho 1945) (“‘The purpose
of all cross-examination is to weaken or show the untruthfulness of the testimony of
the party examined or the party’s bias or prejudice.’” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Hairston, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Idaho 1999) (“‘Cross-
examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting the credibility of the witness,’ but control of the scope of cross-examination
is left to the discretion of the trial court.” (citations omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Fee, 857 P.2d 649, 653 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (“[A]
defendant who takes the stand to testify on his own behalf is subject to cross-examina-
tion, just as is any other witness, subject to certain constitutional protections and con-
straints.” (citations omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Clark v. Klein, 45 P.3d 810, 816 (Idaho 2002) (“Although vested with
broad discretion, a trial court cannot completely deny a party the right of cross-examina-
tion.” (citations omitted)).
ILLINOIS
General Purpose: People v. Plummer, 801 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
(“[C]ross-examination may concern any matter that goes to explain, modify, discredit,
or destroy the testimony of the witness.” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  People v. Salgado, 818 N.E.2d 381, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“[T]he
scope of cross-examination is liberally construed ‘to allow inquiry into whatever subject
tends to explain, discredit, or destroy the witness’ direct testimony.’” (quoting People
v. Terrell, 708 N.E.2d 309, 325 (Ill. 1998))); see also Chapman v. Hubbard Woods
Motors, Inc., 812 N.E.2d 389, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“One of the purposes of cross-
examination is to test the credibility of the witness.  Subject to the court’s discretion
in determining the relative value for such purpose, it is proper to allow inquiry into
collateral matters revealing the past conduct of a witness which tends to impeach the
witness’ credibility.” (citations omitted)).
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Scope in Criminal Cases:  People v. Sutton, 739 N.E.2d 543, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(“A defendant who takes the stand on his own behalf offers himself as a witness, but
also subjects himself to legitimate cross-examination.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Kurrack v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 625 N.E.2d 675, 686 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (“[C]ross-examination is a matter of right and an important aspect of due process.”
(citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  People v. Makiel, 830 N.E.2d 731, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“[C]ross-
examination for the purpose of impeaching credibility . . . may concern any matter that
goes to explain, modify, discredit, or destroy the testimony of the witness.” (citations
omitted)); see also People v. Hayes, 819 N.E.2d 341, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“[A]
cross-examiner may impeach a witness if a proper foundation for the impeachment is
laid; however, he may not impeach a witness on collateral matters.” (citation omitted)).
INDIANA
General Purpose:  Rapier v. State, 435 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. 1982) (“An integral part
of this confrontation is the right to cross-examine the witness and test his recollection
and his credibility before the trier of fact.”).
Scope of Cross:  Mitchell v. State, 730 N.E.2d 197, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“A trial
court also has broad discretion in determining the permissible scope of cross-examina-
tion to test the credibility of a witness.” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Taylor v. State,
358 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the defendant is “entitled to
probe the credibility of a witness, and that in so doing he is not limited to facts testified
to on direct examination” (citation omitted)); see also Guise v. State, 359 N.E.2d 269,
270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (“[A] party has right to cross-examine an opposing party’s
witness on matters which tend to impair the witness’ credibility or to show his or her
interest, bias or motives.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Eldridge v. State, 580 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(“When the defendant chooses to take the stand to testify, he is subject to cross-examina-
tion like any other witness.” (citations omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Lowry v. Lanning, 712 N.E.2d 1000, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“The
right to cross-examine witnesses under oath is a fundamental right.  This right ‘cannot,
unless waived, be denied by any trier of fact, any court or administrative tribunal.’”
(quoting Armes v. Pierce Governor Co., 101 N.E.2d 199, 203-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 1951))).
Impeachment:  Sanders v. State, 823 N.E.2d 313, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“The
credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing a defect in the capacity of a witness
to observe, remember or recount the incident about which she is testifying.” (citation
omitted)).  But see Hightower v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1209, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(“Extrinsic evidence may be used to impeach a witness only if the evidence is in a form
that makes it otherwise admissible.” (citation omitted)).
IOW A
General Purpose:  State v. Shepard, 73 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Iowa 1955) (“[T]he general
purpose of cross-examination [is] to weaken the testimony of the witness or the case
of the party by whom he is called.”).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Damme, 522 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Iowa. Ct. App. 1994) (“A
reasonable latitude must be accorded the person cross-examining but the scope of the
subject of the inquiry rests generally in trial court’s discretion.” (citations omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Holmes, 325 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 1982) (“When
the defendant is the witness, the prosecutor is strictly confined to matters testified to
in the examination in chief.  This does not mean, however, that the ‘prosecutor can only
parrot the questions propounded on direct.’” (quoting State v. Jackson, 259 N.W.2d 796,
800-01 (Iowa 1977))).
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Valuable Right:  Wheatley v. Heideman, 102 N.W.2d 343, 353 (Iowa 1960) (“[P]erti-
nent cross-examination is a valuable right essential to a fair trial and [is] to be jealously
guarded.”).
Impeachment:  State v. Halstead, 362 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Iowa 1985) (“[A] party is
entitled to try to impeach a witness’ credibility as it is reflected in his ability to observe,
remember, or recount.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Roth, 403 N.W.2d 762, 767
(Iowa 1987) (“To be admissible, impeachment evidence must have been admissible for
some proper purpose independent of the contradiction.” (citation omitted)).
KANSAS
Scope of Cross:  Lewis v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 62 P.2d 875, 875 (Kan. 1936)
(“Although cross-examination should be confined to subjects testified to in direct exam-
ination, [the] court may, within its discretion, permit questioning of [a] witness, for [the]
purpose of testing his sincerity and memory, as to matters wholly irrelevant and
collateral to [the] issue.”).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Murdock, 689 P.2d 814, 821 (Kan. 1984) (“When
the defendant takes the stand in a criminal case, he or she is subject to detailed cross-
examination.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Burnett, 558 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Kan.
1976) (“[C]ross-examination of an accused in a criminal case is subject to same rules
which apply to any other witness.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Barnes, 190 P.2d 193, 195 (Kan. 1948) (“To impeach a witness
means to call into question the veracity of the witness by means of evidence offered for
that purpose, or by showing that the witness is unworthy of belief.  Extrinsic evidence
is required for impeachment. . . .”); see also Sanders v. Sitton, 292 P.2d 1099, 1102
(Kan. 1956) (“[W]hen a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of
fact must largely turn on credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony,
the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the
accuracy of his understanding but his memory and credibility as well.”).
KENTUCKY
General Purpose:  Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 144 S.W.2d 519, 521
(Ky. Ct. App. 1940) (“The purpose of cross-examination is by no means limited to
bringing out a falsehood, although it is the most efficient means devised by the law for
the discovery of truth, but it is to test the accuracy of the knowledge of the witness, his
source of information, his motives, interest and memory.”).
Scope of Cross:  Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997) (“[W]hen
the cross-examination is of one other than the defendant, one who is not accused of
having committed a crime and whose liberty is not at stake, greater latitude is generally
allowed. . . . Nevertheless, a connection must be established between a cross-examina-
tion proposed to be undertaken and the facts in evidence.” (citations omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Hayton v. Commonwealth, 332 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky. 1960)
(“When a defendant in a criminal prosecution takes the stand as a witness in his own
behalf, he may be cross-examined as fully and freely as any other witness.” (citations
omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Rolli v. Commonwealth, 678 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)
(“[T]he right to cross-examine a witness to impeach his credibility or show motive or
prejudice is fundamental to a fair trial.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 562 (Ky. 2003) (“The
capacity of a witness to observe, recollect and narrate an occurrence is a proper subject
of inquiry on cross-examination.  If as a result of a mental condition such capacity has
been substantially diminished, evidence of that condition before, at and after the
occurrence and at the time of trial is ordinarily admissible for use by the trier in passing
on the credibility of the witness.” (citation omitted)).
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LOUISIANA
General Purpose:  State v. Rochon, 733 So. 2d 624, 632-33 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“The
three main functions of cross-examination are: (1) to shed light on the credibility of the
direct testimony; (2) to bring out additional facts related to those elicited on direct; and
(3) to bring out additional facts which tend to elucidate any issue in the case.” (citation
omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Nguyen, 888 So. 2d 900, 911 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“The cross-
examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’s story to test his perceptions
and memory, but has traditionally been allowed to impeach the witness.” (citations
omitted)); see also State v. Zeringue, 862 So. 2d 186, 195 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (“As a
general rule, a party may attack the credibility of a witness by examining him or her
concerning any matter having a reasonable tendency to disprove the truthfulness of his
or her testimony.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Rochon, 733 So. 2d at 633 (“When a defendant takes the
stand in his own behalf, he waives his protection against self-incrimination and is subject
to cross-examination just as any other witness.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  State v. Armstrong, 683 So. 2d 1261, 1269 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (“Al-
though the constitutional right to cross-examination lies with defendants, the jurispru-
dence holds the state also ‘has undoubted right to cross-examine defense witnesses.’”
(quoting State v. St. Amand, 274 So. 2d 179, 192 (La. 1973))).  But see Harry Bourg
Corp. v. Punch, 625 So. 2d 735, 737 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“An adverse party should not
be denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witness unless counsel waives his right
or loses this right because of abusive or improper questioning.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Galliano, 696 So. 2d 1043, 1050 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (“[D]e-
fects of capacity, sensory or mental, which lessen the ability to perceive the facts which
the witness purports to have observed, are provable to attack the credibility of the wit-
ness, either upon cross-examination or by producing other witnesses to prove the fact.”
(citations omitted)); see also Cain v. Cain, 903 So. 2d 590, 597 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(“Evidence that is otherwise irrelevant may be admissible to impeach a witness.”
(citation omitted)).
MAINE
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Taylor, 163 A. 777, 778 (Me. 1933) (“When the
accused volunteers to testify in his own behalf at all, upon the issue whether the alleged
crime has been committed or not, he volunteers to testify in full.”).
MARYLAND
General Purpose, Valuable Right:  Waldron v. State, 491 A.2d 595, 599 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1985) (“Cross-examination is the vehicle by which the right of confrontation
is given substance.  Thus, it is a matter of right, not a privilege. . . .  As such, cross-
examination may be directed at generally attacking credibility of witnesses or examining
the presence or absence of bias or motivation for testifying.” (citations omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  Jackson v. State, 752 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)
(“Maryland follows the prevailing American practice of generally limiting cross-
examination to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the
credibility of the witness.  Under this rule, counsel always may cross-examine an
opponent’s witness in order to impeach the witness, but is entitled to ask substantive
questions on cross only in the course of further inquiry into the points bought up on that
witness’ direct examination.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Davis v. State, 205 A.2d 254, 259 (Md. 1964) (“A defendant
in a criminal case who voluntarily takes the witness stand in his own behalf thereby
subjects himself to the same rules of cross-examination that govern other witnesses.
He may properly be cross-examined as to his prior criminal record.” (citations omitted)).
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Impeachment:  Mutyambizi v. State, 363 A.2d 511, 516 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976)
(“[C]ross-examination to impeach, diminish, or impair credit of [a] witness is not con-
fined to matters brought out on direct examination; it may include collateral matters not
embraced in the direct examination to test credibility and veracity, it being proper to
allow any question which reasonably tends to explain, contradict, or discredit any
testimony given by the witness in chief or which tends to test his accuracy, memory,
veracity, character, or credibility.” (citations omitted)).
MASSACHUSETTS
General Purpose, Valuable Right:  Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 557 N.E.2d 728, 733
(Mass. 1990) (“‘Parties to litigation are entitled as a matter of right to the reasonable
cross-examination of witnesses against them for the purpose of attempting to impeach
or discredit their testimony.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Underwood, 265 N.E.2d 577,
582 (Mass. 1970))).
Scope of Cross:  Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 702 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998)
(“The scope of cross-examination, including to what extent the accuracy, veracity, and
credibility of a witness may be tested, rests largely in the sound discretion of the judge,
not subject to revision unless prejudice is shown.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams,
517 N.E.2d 176, 181 (Mass. 1987))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Commonwealth v. Sleeper, 760 N.E.2d 693, 703 (Mass.
2002) (“When a defendant testifies he subjects himself to cross-examination, and the
scope of that examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (citation
omitted)).
Impeachment:  Commonwealth v. Daley, 789 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Mass. 2003) (“In
addition to impeachment by evidence of an untruthful character, a witness may also be
impeached by evidence challenging his testimonial faculties (e.g., the ability to perceive
the events or remember them accurately), and by evidence of a motive to prevaricate,
even though such evidence reveals an otherwise inadmissible fact, such as the witness’s
criminal activity.” (citations omitted)).
M ICHIGAN
General Purpose:  Schwartz v. Triff, 139 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966)
(“‘[T]he party having the right to cross-examine has a right to draw out from the witness
and lay before the jury anything tending or which may tend to contradict, weaken,
modify, or explain the testimony of the witness on direct examination or which tends
or may tend to elucidate the testimony or affect the credibility of the witness.” (quoting
Malicke v. Milan, 30 N.W.2d 440, 442 (Mich. 1948))).
Scope of Cross:  People v. Reid, 592 N.W.2d 767, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A]
witness is subject to cross-examination concerning any issue in a case, including credi-
bility.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  People v. Lloyd, 147 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Mich. Ct. App.
1967) (“The defendant voluntarily took the witness stand on his own behalf and it is
well settled that once a defendant takes the stand he then becomes subject to cross-
examination as any other witness.” (citations omitted)); see also People v. Williams,
182 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (“[O]n cross-examination of a defendant
is [sic] a criminal case, he may be questioned concerning (1) any statement that, during
his direct examination, he claims he made, and (2) any statement any other witness,
during the people’s case in chief, claims he made.”).
Valuable Right:  People v. Baker, 288 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (“The
rights of confrontation in cross-examination are fundamental requirements of a fair trial.”
(citations omitted)).
Impeachment:  People v. Shugar, 185 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (“The
scope of the cross-examination when an attempt is made to impeach a witness is within
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the sound discretion of the trial court.”); see also Hall v. Iosco County Bd. of Road
Comm’rs, 140 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966) (“A witness may not be im-
peached on a collateral issue.  Whether a matter is collateral or not depends upon
whether direct evidence to establish it could be introduced.” (citations omitted)).
M INNESOTA
Scope of Cross: State v. Thornton, 219 N.W. 176, 179 (Minn. 1928) (“Where the
defendant takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf, he thereby waives his privilege,
and the cross-examination is not limited to matters brought out on the direct examination,
but may be extended to any matters pertinent to the issue.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Hunt v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 446 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (“Cross-examination of an adverse witness is an inviolate right.  It is basic
to our judicial system and is an essential element of a fair trial.” (citations omitted)),
rev’d on other grounds, 460 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1990).
Impeachment:  Greene v. Mathiowetz, 3 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Minn. 1942) (“As to matters
collateral to the main issue, for the purpose of testing his credibility, [a witness] cannot
be interrogated merely for the purpose of contradicting him . . .  since, if it were not en-
forced, the issues in many cases might be multiplied indefinitely so that the jury would
be likely to lose sight of the real controversy.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. King,
92 N.W. 965, 965 (Minn. 1903) (“The extent to which the cross-examination of a
witness may go for the purpose of testing his credibility, or showing his bias, prejudice,
or hostility, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.”).
M ISSISSIPPI
Scope of Cross:  Hawkins v. State, 80 So. 2d 1, 11 (Miss. 1955) (“A defendant who
takes the witness stand in his own behalf waives his constitutional privilege of silence,
and the prosecution has the right to cross-examine him upon his evidence in chief as
to the circumstances connected with the crime with the same latitude as would be
exercised in the case of an ordinary witness.”).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Boyce v. State, 97 So. 2d 222, 226 (Miss. 1957) (“[C]on-
siderable latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of the accused . . . .”).
But see Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 791 (Miss. 1988) (“[T]he State [i]s obligated
to present all relevant evidence bearing upon [defendant’s] guilt as part of its case in
chief, not initially through cross-examination of the defendant and his witnesses, and
then offering evidence of such conduct in rebuttal.”).
Valuable Right:  Murphy v. State, 453 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (Miss. 1984) (“The right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses for the state is fundamental and cannot be
substantially restricted.  However, the accused can decline to cross-examine the witness
and no abridgement of his rights takes place.” (citations omitted)).
Impeachment:  Feazell v. State, 750 So. 2d 1286, 1290 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (“The
credibility of witnesses may be attacked by cross-examination and by opinion and
reputation evidence, but not by an attempt to prove with extrinsic evidence that an
answer given by the witness to an extraneous matter was incorrect.” (citation omitted)).
But see Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 848 (Miss. 2005) (“[I]mpeachment evidence is
admissible only for the purpose of impeaching credibility and may not be used for the
purpose of establishing its truth.” (citation omitted)).
M ISSOURI
General Purpose:  State v. DeClue, 128 S.W.3d 864, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“Cross-
examination is used to test the accuracy, veracity, and credibility of a witness, and
therefore, cross-examination is not necessarily limited to those issues that tend to prove
the issues at trial.” (citing State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Mo. 1999))).  
Scope of Cross:  Long v. St. John’s Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 98 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2003) (“As a general rule, a witness may be asked any questions on cross-
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examination that tend to test accuracy, veracity, or credibility, or shake the witness’
credit by injuring his or her character.” (citing Reno v. Wakeman, 869 S.W.2d 219, 223
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993))). But see State v. Franklin, 16 S.W.3d 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(“Scope of cross-examination and determinations regarding witness credibility are mat-
ters largely within the discretion of the trial court.” (citing State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d
925, 935 (Mo. 1997))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 56 (Mo. 1998) (“When
a defendant testifies in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined, contradicted or
impeached the same as any other witness.” (citing State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674,
676 (Mo. 1970))).
Valuable Right:  State v. Jaynes, 949 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (“The right
to cross-examination is essential and indispensable.” (citing State v. Kirkland , 471
S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1971))).
Impeachment:  State v. Russell, 602 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (“[A]ny
evidence which tends to elucidate the credibility of a witness, including the circum-
stances surrounding the event about which he is testifying, is admissible for impeach-
ment purposes.” (citations omitted)); see also Kuehne v. State, 107 S.W.3d 285, 294
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“[E]vidence that is otherwise inadmissible may be admissible to
impeach a witness’s testimony.”); State v. Simmons, 559 S.W.2d 557,  (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) (“A party [may] impeach the testimony of an opponent’s witness, provided such
impeachment does not concern immaterial or collateral matters.” (citations omitted)).
But see Collins v. Hertenstein, 90 S.W.3d 87, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (“‘Immaterial
and incompetent evidence may not be got before the jury under the guise that it im-
peaches or discredits the witness.’” (quoting Hungate v. Hudson, 185 S.W.2d 646, 649
(Mo. 1945))).
MONTANA
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Coloff, 231 P.2d 343, 345 (Mont. 1951) (“A
defendant in a criminal case, if he is sworn and testifies, is subject to same rules of cross-
examination and impeachment as any other witness.” (citing State v. Schnepel, 59 P.
927, 928 (Mont. 1900))).
Valuable Right:  State v. McKnight, 281 P.2d 816, 822 (Mont. 1955) (“‘The right of
cross-examination . . . is a valuable and substantial right, and the courts should incline
to extend, rather than to restrict it.’” (quoting State v. Ritz, 211 P. 298, 300 (Mont.
1922))), overruled in part by State v. Wirtanen, 406 P.2d 376 (Mont. 1965).
Impeachment: State v. Deeds, 243 P.2d 314, 316 (Mont. 1952) (“A witness may not
be impeached by contradicting him on collateral matters.” (quoting State v. Collett, 167
P.2d 584, 586 (Mont. 1946))); see also Green v. Hagele, 595 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Mont.
1979) (“Inquiry on cross-examination should be allowed as wide a range as may be
reasonably necessary to test the skill and reliability of the witness.”); State Highway
Comm’n v. Bennett, 513 P.2d 5, 8 (Mont. 1973) (noting that a witness may be cross-
examined “to bring out facts illustrative of his motives, bias and interest of the witness
or as a reflection upon his capacity and memory” (citations omitted)).
NEBRASKA
General Purpose:  State v. Lewis, 488 N.W.2d 518, 526 (Neb. 1992) (“‘Cross-exam-
ination is proper as to anything tending to affect the accuracy, veracity, or credibility
of the witness.’” (quoting State v. Thaden, 316 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Neb. 1982))). 
Scope of Cross:  State v. McLemore, 623 N.W.2d 315, 329 (Neb. 2001) (“[C]ourts limit
cross-examination of witnesses to the subject matter of the direct examination and mat-
ters affecting the credibility of the witness.” (citation omitted)). But see Lewis, 488
N.W.2d at 526.
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Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Ballard, 467 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Neb. 1991) (“When
a defendant in a criminal case testifies in his own behalf, he is subject to the same rules
of cross-examination as any other witness and may be required to testify on his cross-
examination as to any matter brought out or suggested by him on his direct examina-
tion.” (citing State v. Pitts, 322 N.W.2d 443, 444 (Neb. 1982))).
Valuable Right:  State v. Johnson, 609 N.W.2d 48, 56 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (“‘The
right of a defendant to engage in a searching and wide-ranging cross-examination is an
essential requirement for a fair trial.’” (quoting State v. Thaden, 316 N.W.2d 317, 321
(Neb. 1982))).
Impeachment:  Sleezer v. Lang, 102 N.W.2d 435, 446 (Neb. 1960) (“‘Impeaching evi-
dence is that which is directed to the question of the credibility of the witness.’” (quoting
Drews v. State, 56 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Neb. 1952))); see also Lewis, 488 N.W.2d at 526
(“When the object of the cross-examination is to collaterally ascertain the accuracy or
credibility of the witness, some latitude should be permitted, and the scope of such
latitude is ordinarily subject to the discretion of the trial judge . . . .” (citing Ballard,
467 N.W.2d at 664)).
NEVADA
Scope of Cross:  Bushnell v. State, 599 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Nev. 1979) (“[T]he permis-
sible extent of cross-examination is largely within the sound discretion of the trial
court.”).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Bushnell, 599 P.2d at 1039-40 (noting that the scope of
cross-examination is within discretion of trial court, with the broadest discretion allowed
for attacks on general credibility and more narrow discretion where bias is the basis for
the cross-examination).
Valuable Right:  Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Nev. 1985) (Although “[a]
defendant’s rights to present witnesses in his own behalf, to confront and to cross-exam-
ine the witnesses against him are fundamental rights, secured by the Sixth Amendment,
and applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment[,] . . . the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses may, in appropriate cases, bow to ‘accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’” (quoting Chambers v. Miss.,
410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973))).
Impeachment:  Collman v. State, 7 P.3d 426, 440 (Nev. 2000) (“One may be impeached
with respect to such matters as perception, memory, communication, sincerity, or bias.”
(citation omitted)); see also Lobato v. State, 96 P.3d 765, 770 (Nev. 2004) (“There are
nine basic modes of impeachment. The first four involve attacks upon the competence
of a witness to testify, i.e., attacks based upon defects of perception, memory, communi-
cation and ability to understand the oath to testify truthfully.  The second four modes
of impeachment involve the use of evidence of prior convictions, prior inconsistent state-
ments, specific incidents of conduct and ulterior motives for testifying.  The ninth mode
of impeachment . . . permits attack upon a witness’s reputation for truthfulness and
necessarily involves the use of extrinsic evidence.” (citation omitted)).
NEW  HAMPSHIRE
Scope of Cross, Impeachment:  State v. Brooks, 495 A.2d 1258, 1262 (N.H. 1985)
(“[The state] allow[s] inquiry into collateral issues by cross-examination for impeach-
ment purposes; however, the cross-examiner must take the answer and may not call other
witnesses to rebut it.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Grierson, 69 A.2d 851, 853-54 (N.H. 1949) (noting
that when a criminal defendant voluntarily testifies, he subjects himself to the general
cross-examination rules and accordingly can be examined “regarding any relevant matter
. . . [tending] ‘to discredit him as a witness’” (citation omitted)).
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Valuable Right:  Kennedy v. Ricker, 409 A.2d 778, 781 (N.H. 1979) (“[C]ross-
examination of a witness is a matter of right.” (citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687, 691 (1931))).
NEW  JERSEY
General Purpose:  State v. Castagna, 870 A.2d 653, 672 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005) (“[C]ross-examination is often used to probe a witness’s testimony in order to:
(1) identify inconsistencies; (2) bring to the jury’s attention any plausible grounds for
bias in favor of the witness’s proponent or against the cross-examiner’s client; and (3)
develop and exploit, within the framework of the lawyer’s ethical obligations, any other
avenue that undermines the witness’s credibility.”).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Gaikwad, 793 A.2d 39, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(“While . . . “‘a paramount purpose of cross-examination is the impeachment of the
credibility of the witness, a cross-examiner does not have a license to roam at will under
the guise of impeaching credibility.’” (citations omitted)).  But see State v. Wormley,
701 A.2d 944, 950 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (noting that the cross-examiner is
not only permitted to inquire into the witness’s story to test his perception and memory,
but he is also allowed to discredit the witness, even if the witness’s story is more reliable
than the client’s).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Bonet, 333 A.2d 267, 269 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1975) (“[T]he scope of cross-examination of a defendant who testifies on his own behalf
is not limited solely to matters brought out on his direct examination but may, in the
trial court’s discretion, cover other relevant matters.” (citations omitted)).
Valuable Right:  State v. Williams, 571 A.2d 1358, 1366 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990) (“The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is a fundamental
aspect of a fair trial.” (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965))).
Impeachment:  State v. O’Brien, 873 A.2d 554, 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(“‘[A]ny fact which bears against the credibility of a witness is relevant to the issue
being tried, and the party against whom the witness is called has a right to have that fact’
presented to the jury to aid them in determining credibility.” (quoting State v. Pontery,
117 A.2d 473, 480 (1955))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 873 A.2d 1268 (N.J. 2004).
NEW  MEXICO
Scope of Cross:  State v. Curtis, 529 P.2d 1249, 1250 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (“While
the extent to which cross-examination may be allowed is largely within the discretion
of the trial court, the right to cross-examine cannot be so restricted as to wholly deprive
a party of the opportunity to test the credibility of a witness.” (citing State v. Martin,
209 P.2d 525 (1949); State v. Talamante, 165 P.2d 812 (1946))); see also State v.
Wilcoxson, 188 P.2d 611, 613 (N.M. 1948) (“‘[T]he cross examination of a witness
should be limited to those facts and circumstances connected with the matters inquired
of in the direct examination, except as to those tending to discredit or impeach the
witness, or to show his bias or prejudice, or the like.’” (quoting Krametbauer v.
McDonald, 104 P.2d 900, 904 (N.M. 1940))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Wildgrube, 75 P.3d 862, 872-73 (N.M. Ct. App.
2003) (“‘If [the defendant in a criminal case] takes the stand and testifies in his own
defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any
other witness . . . . [H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in
his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.” (quoting
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958))).
Student Materials EditorValuable Right:  Empire W . Cos., Inc. v. Albuquerque
Testing Labs., Inc., 800 P.2d 725, 728 (N.M. 1990) (“The right to cross-examine is
valuable and may not be restricted so as to deprive a party of the right to test the
credibility of a witness or to preclude elucidation of the testimony.” (citations omitted)).
2005] CONVERSATIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION 385
Impeachment:  Mac Tyres, Inc. v. Vigil, 589 P.2d 1037, 1039 (N.M. 1979) (“The right
to impeach a witness is basic to a fair trial.”).  But see Kiker v. Bank Sav. Life Ins. Co.,
23 P.2d 366, 369 (N.M. 1933) (“[I]mpeachment is not proper on immaterial matters.”
(citing State v. Kile, 218 P. 347, 352 (N.M. 1923))).
NEW  YORK
General Purpose:  People v. Terry, 618 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(“One of the purposes of cross-examination is to bring out inconsistencies among various
witnesses to the same event, thereby demonstrating a lack of credibility.”).
Scope of Cross:  People v. Rhodes, 782 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (“The
scope of cross-examination of a witness concerning collateral matters designed to attack
credibility rests largely within the discretion of the trial court.” (citations omitted)); see
also People v. Stroman, 730 N.Y.S.2d 612, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (“[I]t is within
the court’s discretion to limit questioning ‘not relevant to the issues, but bearing on the
credibility of a witness.’” (quoting People v. Duffy,  326 N.E.2d 804, 807 ( N.Y. 1975))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  People v. Overlee, 666 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (“Once a defendant testifies and places his credibility in issue, a prosecutor need
not tread lightly in cross-examining him or arguing his case to the jury. The prosecutor
must not, of course, stray from the record evidence or relevant issues.” (citation
omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Murov v. Celentano, 776 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)
(“[C]ross-examination of adverse witnesses is a matter of right in any trial of a disputed
issue of fact, . . .” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment: People v. Walker, 498 N.Y.S.2d 521, 525 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“A
party has the right to impeach or discredit the testimony of an opponent, and such
evidence is always competent.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., People v. Carrier, 706
N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (“A defect that substantially affects the
witness’s testimonial capacity may be shown by cross-examination or extrinsic evidence
to affect the credibility of the witness.” (citations omitted)).
NORTH CAROLINA
General Purpose:  State v. Sanchez, 621 S.E.2d 630, 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“Cross-
examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth
of his testimony are tested.” (citing Davis v. State, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974))).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Lee, 439 S.E.2d 547, 560 (N.C. 1994) (“Cross-examination
of a witness as to any matter relevant to any issue, including credibility, is proper.”
(citations omitted)); see also State v. Scott, 471 S.E.2d 605, 620 (N.C. 1996) (“Cross-
examination may ordinarily be made to serve three purposes: (1) to elicit further details
of the story related on direct, in the hope of presenting a complete picture less
unfavorable to the cross-examiner’s case; (2) to bring out new and different facts
relevant to the whole case; and (3) to impeach the witness, or cast doubt upon her
credibility.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Boekenoogen, 554 S.E.2d 848, 851 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (“[W]hen a criminal defendant takes the stand to testify on his own behalf, he
is subject to cross-examination to the same extent as any other witness.” (citing State
v. Faison, 411 S.E.2d 143, 151 (N.C. 1991))); see also State v. Rush, 456 S.E.2d 819,
826 (N.C. 1995) (“Counsel is given wide latitude and has the right and duty to cross-
examine vigorously a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense.”).
Valuable Right:  Jones (Griffin) v. Rochelle, 479 S.E.2d 231, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(“‘A party has the right to an opportunity to fairly and fully cross-examine a witness
who has testified for the adverse party.  This right, with respect to the subject of his
examination-in-chief, is absolute and not merely a privilege.” (quoting Citizens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Reid Motor Co., 5 S.E.2d 318, 320 (N.C. 1939))).
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Impeachment:  London v. Turnmire, 328 S.E.2d 847, 848 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(“[C]redibility may be attacked on cross-examination by showing inter alia prior bad
acts, a bad moral character, a mental or physical condition affecting her memory,
perception or veracity, or by evidence that the witness has made other statements
inconsistent with her testimony at trial.” (citation omitted));  see also State v. Alston,
195 S.E.2d 314, 315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973) (“Much latitude is allowed in showing the
bias, hostility or other interest of a witness with respect to the case or other facts tending
to prove that the testimony of the witness is unworthy of credit.” (citing State v.
Roberson, 3 S.E.2d 277, 279 (N.C. 1939))); State v. Parker, 262 S.E.2d 686, 688 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1980) (“[A] witness may be impeached by questions as to his mental state.”
(citations omitted)).
NORTH DAKOTA
Scope of Cross:  Langness v. Fencil Urethane Sys., Inc., 667 N.W.2d 596, 609 (N.D.
2003) (“The scope of cross-examination for impeachment purposes is within the trial
court’s discretion.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Apley, 141 N.W. 740, 744 (N.D.
1913) (holding that it is proper to ask a witness  questions the answers to which tend
to discredit, disgrace, or incriminate him, where the purpose for cross-examination is
to impeach the witness’s credibility).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91, 100 (N.D. 1965) (“A
defendant in a criminal case who voluntarily takes the stand is subject to the same rules
of cross-examination as any other witness.  He is required to answer any relevant and
proper question on cross-examination, the answer to which will tend to convict him of
the crime for which he is being tried, even though such answer may also incriminate
him of a collateral crime.” (citations omitted)).
Valuable Right:  State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 171 (N.D. 1974) (“The right [of
cross-examination] is absolute and the denial of the right as to material evidence is
prejudicial error requiring a new trial.” (citing Knoepfle v. Suko, 108 N.W.2d 456, 463
(N.D. 1961))).
Impeachment:  State v. Hanson, 73 N.W.2d 135, 138 (N.D. 1955) (“Evidence
impeaches a witness when it assails his general credibility or otherwise weakens the
force of his testimony and detracts from the weight to be given it.”); see also State v.
Klein, 593 N.W.2d 325, 328 (N.D. 1999) (“Any party may attack the credibility of a
witness by impeachment.” (citations omitted)); State v. Dinger, 260 N.W. 251, 251 (N.D.
1935) (“A witness may be interrogated on cross-examination for the purpose of testing
the accuracy of his recollection.”).
OHIO
General Purpose:  Baird v. Cincinnati Transit Co., 168 N.E.2d 413, 417 (Ohio Ct. App.
1959) (“[T]he primary purpose of cross-examination is to test the accuracy, truthfulness,
soundness, and thereby the credibility, of testimony given by a witness on direct
examination.” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Debo, 222 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1966) (“[M]ore
latitude is usually given on cross-examination than on direct.”); see also Fawick Airflex
Co. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 735, C.I.O., 92 N.E.2d 436,
445 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1950) (“Cross-examination is permitted first to test the accuracy
of a witness’s testimony given in chief and second to test his credibility.”).
Scope in Criminal Cases: State v. Roten, 776 N.E.2d 551, 553 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2002)
(“A criminal defendant who voluntarily takes the stand in his own defense voluntarily
subjects himself to proper cross-examination.” (citing State v. Jacocks, 582 N.E.2d 1079,
1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990))).
Valuable Right:  State v. Brinkley, 824 N.E.2d 959, 979 (Ohio 2005) (“Cross-
examination of a witness is a matter of right, but the ‘extent of cross-examination with
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respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.’” (quoting State v. Green, 609 N.E.2d 1253, 1259 (Ohio 1993))).
Impeachment:  Rumora v. Board of Ed. of Ashtabula Area City Sch. Dist., 335 N.E.2d
378, 391 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1973) ([“]Independent evidence on collateral issues for
the purpose of impeachment of a witness [is] ordinarily not admissible.”).
OKLAHOM A
General Purpose:  Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Bass, 698 P.2d 947, 949 (Okla. Civ. App. 1985)
(“[C]ross-examination is available to achieve two things: (1) develop relevant truth
related to matters covered on direct examination; and (2) impeach the veracity or
credibility of a witness.”).
Scope of Cross:  In re Adoption of M.C.D., 42 P.3d 873, 883 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)
(“Cross-examination is available to develop relevant truth related to matters covered
on direct examination and to impeach the veracity or credibility of a witness.” (citation
omitted)); see also In re D.J.L., 964 P.2d 983, 986 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (“Cross
examination should be liberally allowed for its purposes of explaining, contradicting
or discrediting testimony or testing the accuracy, memory, veracity or credibility of a
witness.” (citing Harris v. State, 777 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989))); Charm
v. State, 924 P.2d 754, 769 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (“Cross-examination may exceed
the scope of direct in order to effect impeachment of a witness’s accuracy, memory,
veracity or credibility.” (citing Hall v. State, 698 P.2d 33, 36 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Shultz v. State, 811 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991) (“[W]hen the defendant takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, he is subject
to all the rules applicable to other witnesses on cross-examination.” (citing Coleman
v. State, 600 P.2d 351, 353 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Brown v. State, 487 P.2d 963, 966
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971))).
Valuable Right:  Flo-Bend, Inc. v. Pullam, 570 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Okla. 1977) (“The
right of cross-examination is a valuable right given by law.  Cross-examination is a
safeguard to truthfulness and accuracy and may be used to discredit a witness or develop
facts favorable to the cross-examining party.” (citing Frierson v. Hines, 426 P.2d 362,
364 (Okla. 1967))).
Impeachment:  Charm , 924 P.2d at 769 (“Cross-examination may exceed the scope
of direct in order to effect impeachment of a witness’s accuracy, memory, veracity or
credibility.” (citing  Hall, 698 P.2d at 36)).  But see White v. State, 458 P.2d 322, 325
(Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (“While it is permissible for counsel to impeach a witness, he
cannot do so through hearsay or immaterial matters.”); see also Hammons v. State, 254
P.2d 793, 796-97 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953) (“[A] witness cannot be impeached on
collateral matters.” (citation omitted)).
OREGON
Scope of Cross:  State v. Hubbard, 688 P.2d 1311, 1319 (Or. 1984) (“‘It is the essence
of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is
unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop.
Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper
setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which
the jury can’t fairly appraise them.’”  (quoting Alford, 282 U.S. at 692)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Cook, 59 P.2d 249, 253 (Or. 1936) (stating that
when an accused takes the witness stand to testify, he is subject to the same rules in
regard to cross-examination as any other witness).
Valuable Right:  State v. Hoover, 433 P.2d 244, 246 (Or. 1967) (“‘[W]here an adverse
witness gives testimony bearing upon a question directly in issue, cross-examination
with respect to such testimony is a matter of right . . . .’” (citing Mannix v. Portland
Telegram, 284 P. 837, 837 (Or. 1930))).
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Impeachment:  State v. Longoria, 520 P.2d 912, 921 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (“Great
latitude should be given to the cross-examiner to test the memory and competency of
the witness, but there are bounds to that latitude.  While the drawing of the bounds is
largely within the discretion of the trial judge, the considerations are different for attacks
upon veracity or credibility, and attacks upon competency or memory.” (citation
omitted)); see also State v. Johanesen, 873 P.2d 1065, 1071 (Or. 1994) (observing that
the law of impeachment distinguishes between “intrinsic evidence,” and “extrinsic
evidence,” in that “intrinsic evidence” is evidence elicited from a witness whose
credibility is drawn into question and “extrinsic evidence” is evidence produced from
some other source, other than testimony given at instant proceeding by witness in
question); Flande v. Brazel, 386 P.2d 920, 922 (Or. 1963) (“[Although] one cannot
impeach on a collateral matter[,] . . . the matter should be one for the trial court’s
discretion.” (citing Coles v. Harsch, 276 P. 248, 251 (Or. 1929))).
PENNSYLVANIA
General Purpose:  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 783 A.2d 328, 334 (Pa Super. Ct. 2001)
(“[C]ross-examination may be used to test a witness’ story, to impeach credibility, or
to establish the witness’ motive for lying.” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  Commonwealth v. Robinson, 877 A.2d 433, 449 (Pa. 2005) (“On
cross-examination, counsel may question the witness concerning subjects raised during
direct examination, may refute inferences raised during direct testimony, and may
attempt to discredit a witness through questions about acts or omissions inconsistent
with his testimony.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Commonwealth v. Dobrolenski, 334 A.2d 268, 273 (Pa.
1975) (“‘If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be
impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of
his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.’” (quoting Brown,
356 U.S. at 154-55)).
Valuable Right:  Commonwealth v. Fox, 619 A.2d 327, 235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(“[T]he right to cross-examination is essential to the protections granted under the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” (citations omitted)).
Impeachment:  Feingold v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 488 A.2d 284, 290 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) (“A witness may be impeached with respect to prior inconsistent statements,
contradiction of facts, bias or character.” (citation omitted)).  But see Zubrod v. Kuhn,
53 A.2d 604, 605 (Pa. 1947) (holding that a witness may not be impeached on a
collateral matter).
RHODE ISLAND
General Purpose:  State v. Cianci, 430 A.2d 756, 762 (R.I. 1981) (“A basic purpose
of cross-examination is to impeach the credibility of an adversary witness, and a trial
justice may within his sound judicial discretion permit interrogation designed to
accomplish that purpose.” (citations omitted)).
Scope of Cross: State v. Jimenez, 882 A.2d 549, 553 (R.I. 2005) (“Questions that are
calculated to explain, contradict, or discredit a witness’s direct examination testimony
are permitted on cross-examination, as are questions designed to test the accuracy,
memory, veracity, or credibility of the witness.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1111 (R.I. 1992) (“A
defendant who testifies on his own behalf is a witness and is subject, therefore, ‘to a
searching cross-examination to rebut not only the facts stated but also the inferences
and conclusions that might be drawn from such testimony.’” (quoting State v. Dowell,
512 A.2d 121, 124 (R.I. 1986))); see also State v. Filuminia, 668 A.2d 336, 338 (R.I.
1995) (“A defendant may be cross-examined not only on the basis of what he
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specifically states by way of factual information but also in respect to inferences and
conclusions that would naturally and probably be drawn from such testimony.” (citation
omitted)).
Valuable Right:  State v. Eckhart, 367 A.2d 1073, 1075 (R.I. 1977) (holding that the
right to an effective cross-examination is secured by the sixth amendment, the fourteenth
amendment in state criminal trials, and Article 1, Section 10 of the Rhode Island
Constitution).
Impeachment:  State v. Gordon, 880 A.2d 825, 838 (R.I. 2005) (“Although cross-
examination is generally limited to the scope of direct examination, questions calculated
to explain, contradict or discredit a witness’s testimony or designed to test the witness’s
accuracy, memory, veracity, credibility or bias are often permissible.” (citation omitted));
see also State v. Fillion, 785 A.2d 536, 539 (R.I. 2001) (“The scope of cross-examination
for the purpose of impeaching a witness’s credibility is not unlimited, however, and it
is permissible for a trial justice to reject evidence that is either not relevant or ‘not
probative of any bias or motive.’”(citing State v. Texter, 594 A.2d 376, 377 (R.I. 1991))).
SOUTH CAROLINA
General Purpose:  Hansson v. Gen. Insulation & Acoustics, 107 S.E.2d 41, 42 (S.C.
1959) (“The general range and extent of cross-examination is within the discretion of
the trial Judge subject, of course, to the limitations that it must relate to matters pertinent
to the issue or to specific acts which tend to discredit the witness or impeach his moral
character . . . .” (citations omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Sierra, 523 S.E.2d 187, 190 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (“‘Consider-
able latitude is allowed in the cross-examination of a witness (always within the control
and direction of the presiding judge) to test the accuracy of his memory, his bias,
prejudice, interest, or credibility.  In doing so the witness may be asked questions in
reference to irrelevant matter, or in reference to prior statements contradictory of his
testimony, or in reference to statements as to relevant matter not contradictory of his
testimony.’” (citing McMillan v. Ridges, 91 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1956))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Young, 409 S.E.2d 352, 354 (S.C. 1991) (“A
defendant who testifies may be cross-examined on evidence which fairly tends to affect
his credibility.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  State v. Jenkins, 474 S.E.2d 812, 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“Gen-
erally, the right to cross-examine a prosecuting witness is of constitutional dimensions,
being essential to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Carson, 126 S.E. 755, 757 (S.C. 1925) (“[A] witness can be
impeached only as to matters within the legitimate scope of cross-examination . . . .”
(citation omitted)); see also State v. Bigham, 131 S.E. 603, 606 (S.C. 1926) (noting that
the truth and veracity of an accused may be impeached).  But see Crowder v. Carroll,
161 S.E.2d 235, 239 (S.C. 1968) (“Generally a foundation has to be laid for impeach-
ment . . . .” (citation omitted)).
SOUTH DAKOTA
Scope of Cross:  State v. McCord, 505 N.W.2d 388, 394 (S.D. 1993) (“It is the
responsibility of counsel during cross-examination to inquire into a witness’ opportunity
for observation, capacity for observation, attention and intent and distraction or division
of attention.” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Chamley, 568 N.W.2d 607, 616 (S.D.
1997) (“The issue of credibility is a matter which may be inquired into on cross exami-
nation.” (citation omitted)).
Student Materials EditorScope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Phelps, 59 N.W. 471,
475 (S.D. 1894) (“A person accused of a crime, who testifies in his own behalf, may
be, in the discretion of the court, subjected to a cross-examination on the whole case,
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including facts which tend to impeach his moral character or affect his credibility as
a witness, or for the purpose of laying the foundation for impeachment.” (citations
omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Wiegers, 373 N.W.2d 1, 10 (S.D. 1985) (“[I]mpeachment
evidence must . . . satisfy the general test of admissibility.”).
TENNESSEE
General Purpose:  State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d 751, 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)
(“Cross-examination tests not only the witness’s perception and recollection of the
account given but also the witness’s credibility.” (citation omitted)); see also Buchanan
v. Harris, 902 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“A witness may be cross-
examined, not only to show his lack of disposition to tell the truth, but also to show want
of capacity to tell the truth.” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Gosnell, 62 S.W.3d 740, 749 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)
(“[L]awyers should be accorded wide latitude in cross-examining witnesses.” (citation
omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Gray v. State, 250 S.W.2d 86, 92 (Tenn. 1952) (“[W]hen
a defendant takes the witness stand in his own behalf he is subject to same methods of
cross-examination as an ordinary witness.” (citations omitted)).
Valuable Right:  State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tenn. 1981) (“[T]he right of cross-
examination is essential to a fair trial.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Carroll, 36 S.W.3d 854, 866 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (“[A]
party may attempt to impeach a witness by demonstrating his impaired capacity either
at the time of the occurrence which is the subject of his testimony or at the time of his
testimony.” (citations omitted)).  But see State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 892 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1999) (“Impeachment cannot be a ‘mere ruse’ to present to the jury preju-
dicial or improper testimony.” (citation omitted)).
TEXAS
General Purpose:  Callahan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)
(“Cross-examination serves three purposes: to identify the witness with his community
so that independent testimony may be sought and offered concerning the witness’s
reputation for veracity in that community; to allow the jury to assess the credibility of
the witness; and to bring facts forward that tend to discredit the witness by showing that
his testimony was untrue or biased.” (citation omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (“The trial
judge should allow the accused great latitude to show any relevant fact that might tend
to affect the witness’s credibility.” (citations omitted)); see also Surredin v. State, 165
S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“Only general questions can be asked during
cross-examination in an effort to discredit a witness, and the witness cannot be asked
questions regarding a collateral fact merely with a view to contradict him afterwards
by calling another witness.” (citation omitted)); Saglimbeni v. State, 100 S.W.3d 429,
435 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (“The right to cross-examination includes ‘the right to impeach
the witness with relevant evidence that might reflect bias, interest, prejudice, inconsistent
statements, traits of character affecting credibility, or evidence that might go to any
impairment or disability affecting the witness’s credibility.’” (quoting Virts v. State,
739 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. App.1987))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Polk v. State, 170 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005)
(“‘A criminal defendant who chooses to testify may be impeached, contradicted, cross-
examined on new matters, and treated in every respect as any other witness, as long as
any overriding constitutional or statutory prohibitions for the defendant’s protection are
honored.’” (quoting Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)));
see also Caron v. State, 162 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he scope of
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cross-examination is wide open, and once the defendant testifies at trial, he opens him-
self up to questioning by the prosecutor on any subject matter that is relevant.” (citation
omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Elmore, 58 S.W.3d 154, 157-58 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2001) (“‘Cross-examination is a safeguard essential to a fair trial and a corner-
stone in the quest for truth.  Longstanding principles of jurisprudence recognize the right
and necessity of full and complete cross-examination . . . .’” (quoting Davidson v. Great
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. 1987))).
Impeachment:  Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“[A]
defendant may be contradicted, impeached, discredited, attacked, sustained, bolstered,
made to give evidence against himself, cross-examined as to new matters, and treated
in every respect as any other witness.” (citation omitted)); see also Scott v. State, 162
S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he right to cross-examination includes the
right to impeach the witness with evidence that might go to any impairment or disability
affecting the witness’s credibility.” (citations omitted)); Roberts v. State, 963 S.W.2d
894, 900 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (“The right of an accused to cross-examine a testifying
State’s witness includes the right to impeach the witness with relevant evidence that
might reflect bias, interest, prejudice, inconsistent statements, traits of character affecting
credibility, or evidence that might go to any impairment or disability affecting the wit-
ness’ credibility.” (citations omitted)).  But see Garza v. State, 18 S.W.3d 813, 822 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000) (“It is improper to impeach a witness on an immaterial or collateral
matter.” (citations omitted)).
UTAH
Scope of Cross, Impeachment:  Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982)
(“To the extent that a witness may be cross-examined on matters that affect his
credibility, . . . the witness has a privilege not to answer questions that tend to disgrace
or degrade him or his family.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 256, 259-60 (Utah 1985) (“When
the accused takes the stand, he opens himself to cross-examination like any other wit-
ness.  That includes cross-examination on matters that would tend to contradict, explain,
or cast doubt upon the credibility of his testimony.” (citations omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Hunter v. Michaelis, 198 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1948) (“The right to
cross-examine a witness is a valuable right, which must not be curtailed by withdrawal
of the witness so that such right is in effect denied.”).
VERM ONT
Scope of Cross: State v. Voorheis, 844 A.2d 794, 801-02 (Vt. 2004) (“‘Wide latitude
should be allowed on cross-examination for the purpose of showing who and what the
witness is, and that he is unreliable, prejudiced, or biased.’” (quoting State v. Berard,
315 A.2d 501, 508 (Vt. 1974))).  But see Barrett v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp. of
Vt., 487 A.2d 1074, 1075 (Vt. 1984) (“Although the credibility of a witness is always
open to attack and wide latitude should be allowed in cross-examination for this purpose,
the scope of this latitude is not unlimited, particularly on collateral issues.” (citation
omitted)).
Valuable Right:  West-Nesbitt, Inc. v. Randall, 236 A.2d 676, 679 (Vt. 1967) (“[C]ross-
examination is a right, yet the court may control the exercise of it to any extent that does
not infringe the right itself.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Raymond, 538 A.2d 164, 165-66 (Vt. 1987) (“Cross-
examination is vitally important for a defendant ‘to establish the identity of the witness
so that the jury can place the witness in his environment, know who he is, and weigh
his evidence.’  This is particularly true where ‘the evidence consists of the testimony
of individuals . . . [who might be] motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance,
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prejudice, or jealousy.’” (citations omitted)).  But see State v. Beshaw, 359 A.2d 654,
656 (Vt. 1976) (“The manner, extent and scope of impeachment testimony lies within
the limits of judicial discretion.” (citation omitted)).
V IRGINIA
Scope of Cross:  Denis v. Commonwealth, 131 S.E. 131, 135 (Va. 1926) (“The
admissibility of the testimony on cross-examination, in which great latitude is allowed,
rested largely in the discretion of the trial court, and we do not think its discretion has
been abused.”); see also Spruill v. Commonwealth, 271 S.E.2d 419, 425 (Va. 1980)
(“[D]etermination of the scope of cross-examination in general, and of the extent of
testimonial impeachment in particular, should be ‘left largely to the sound discretion
of the trial court; and the rule is well established that an appellate court will not interfere,
unless that discretion has been plainly abused.’” (quoting Worrell v. Kinnear Co., 49
S.E. 988, 990 (Va. 1905))).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Wells v. Commonwealth, 531 S.E.2d 16, 21 (Va. Ct. App.
2000) (“[A]n accused who takes the stand waives his right against self-incrimination
in its entirety, not just selectively, and may be cross-examined on any subject related
to the offenses for which he is on trial.” (citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Food Lion, Inc. v. Cox, 513 S.E.2d 860, 861 (Va. 1999) (“[C]ross-
examination of a witness ‘is not a privilege but an absolute right.’” (quoting Basham
v. Terry, 102 S.E.2d 285, 290 (Va. 1958))).
Impeachment:  McCarter v. Commonwealth, 566 S.E.2d 868, 869 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)
(“When a witness takes the stand, she puts her credibility at issue in the case.” (citation
omitted)); see also Va. & N.C. Wheel Co. v. Chalkley, 34 S.E. 976, 977 (Va. 1900)
(“[U]pon cross-examination [the lawyer] had the right to ask any question which tended
to test the witness’ accuracy, veracity, or credibility, as the questions complained of
clearly did.” (citation omitted)).
WASHINGTON
General Purpose:  State v. Darden, 41 P.3d 1189, 1193 (Wash. 2002) (“The purpose
[of cross-examination] is to test the perception, memory, and credibility of witnesses.”
(citations omitted)).
Scope of Cross:  State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 201 (Wash. 1991) (“[C]ross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
the credibility of the witness.”).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Graham, 798 P.2d 314, 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(“A defendant may be vigorously cross-examined in the same manner as any other
witness if he voluntarily asserts his right to testify.  The scope of cross-examination is
within the discretion of the trial court and may be conducted so as to explain, qualify
and rebut defendant’s direct testimony, including examination on issues he or she
introduced to the jury.” (citations omitted)).
Valuable Right:  State v. Kalamarski, 620 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
(“Although the right to cross-examine is basic, it is not absolute.”).  But see State v.
Knapp, 540 P.2d 898, 902 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]he right to cross-examination
in a criminal case is fundamental and zealously guarded by our courts.” (citation
omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Allen S., 989 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(“Evidence offered to impeach is relevant only if: (1) it tends to cast doubt on the
credibility of the person being impeached, and (2) the credibility of the person being
impeached is a fact of consequence to the action.”); see also State v. Froehlich, 635 P.2d
127, 129 (Wash. 1981) (“Cross-examination as to a mental state or condition, to impeach
a witness, is permissible.” (citation omitted)).  But see State v. Hubbard, 693 P.2d 718,
721 (Wash. 1985) (“To be admissible, such extrinsic evidence [that attacks the
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credibility of a witness] must be independently competent and must be admissible for
a purpose other than that of attacking the credibility of the witness.” (citation omitted)).
WEST V IRGINIA
Scope of Cross:  State v. Ladd, 557 S.E.2d 820, 844 (W. Va. 2001) (“‘Several basic
rules exist as to cross-examination of a witness.  The first is that the scope of cross-
examination is coextensive with, and limited by, the material evidence given on direct
examination.  The second is that a witness may also be cross-examined about matters
affecting his credibility.  The term ‘credibility’ includes the interest and bias of the
witness, inconsistent statements made by the witness and to a certain extent the witness’
character.  The third rule is that the trial judge has discretion as to the extent of cross-
examination.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Bradshaw, 457 S.E.2d 456, 478 (W. Va. 1995) (“[A]
defendant who voluntarily offers himself as a witness and testifies in his own behalf
subjects himself to legitimate and pertinent cross-examination to test his veracity and
credibility.”).
Valuable Right: State v. Graham, 541 S.E.2d 341, 345 (W. Va. 2000) (“‘[A] defendant
on trial has the right to be accorded a full and fair opportunity to fully examine and
cross-examine the witnesses.  However, this right is not unbridled.’” (quoting State v.
Crockett, 265 S.E.2d 268, 269 (W. Va. 1979))).
Impeachment:  McDougal v. McCammon, 455 S.E.2d 788, 795 (W. Va. 1995) (“Our
prior cases have permitted the attacking party to admit evidence that, if credited by the
jury, would raise doubts about a prior witness’s testimony.”).
W ISCONSIN
Scope of Cross:  Desjarlais v. State, 243 N.W.2d 453, 464 (Wis. 1976) (“Although this
state follows the ‘wide open cross-examination rule,’ . . . that theory deals only with
the scope of cross-examination as not being bound by the subjects touched upon in direct
examination.  It does not permit the admission of prejudicial, irrelevant or other
objectionable matters.” (citation omitted)).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  State v. Patino, 502 N.W.2d 601, 613 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that when a defendant voluntarily takes the stand on his on behalf, he waives
his right to remain silent and allows the prosecution “to cross-examine him with the
same latitude as would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness”).
Valuable Right:  Neider v. Spoehr, 165 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Wis. 1969) (“[A] party has
the right to cross-examine witnesses who testify against him.” (citation omitted)).
Impeachment:  State v. Ross, 659 N.W.2d 122, 133-34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (“The
extent and scope of cross-examination allowed for impeachment purposes is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (citation omitted)).
WYOMING
Scope of Cross:  Hannon v. State, 84 P.3d 320, 329 (Wyo. 2004) (“Subject always to
the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing inter-
rogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test
the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been
allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.  One way of discrediting the witness
is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness.”).  But see Law
v. State, 98 P.3d 181, 189 (Wyo. 2004) (“The general rule is that a cross-examiner can-
not contradict a witness’ answers concerning collateral matters by producing extrinsic
evidence for the sole purpose of impeaching credibility.  However, an exception to this
rule exists where the evidence sought to be introduced is relevant to some issue in the
case other than credibility or if independently admissible to impeach the witness.”).
Scope in Criminal Cases:  Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 12 (Wyo. 2000) (“A defendant
who has voluntarily testified may be cross-examined the same as any other witness and
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the latitude of cross-examination is largely within the discretion of the court . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
Valuable Right:  Jensen v. State, 116 P.3d 1088, 1092 (Wyo. 2005) (“A defendant’s
right to cross-examine a witness . . . is not unfettered.  The right is subject to the trial
court’s ‘discretion to . . . prevent . . . questioning that is repetitive or of marginal
relevance.’” (citations omitted)).
Impeachment:  Law, 98 P.3d at 189 (“[A]ny permissible kind of impeaching matter
may be developed on cross-examination, since one of the purposes of cross-examination
is to test the credibility of the witness.  However, the cross-examiner may not impeach
a witness on a collateral matter.” (citation omitted)).
